People v. Ramos
52 Cal.App.4th 300, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 97 Daily Journal DAR 993 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A dwelling is not 'inhabited' for the purpose of a first-degree burglary charge if the sole resident is deceased at the time of the unlawful entry. An 'inhabited dwelling' requires an occupant who is either present or temporarily absent with an intent to return, a condition a deceased person cannot meet.
Facts:
- On November 23, 1994, Virgil Wagner died at his home from natural causes.
- On the same day, Edmond James Ramos went to Wagner's house with the intent to steal property.
- After knocking and receiving no answer, Ramos believed the house was empty.
- Ramos broke a window to gain entry into the house.
- Inside, Ramos looked into Wagner's bedroom and saw a body on the bed.
- Ramos approached and observed that Wagner's body was stiff and his eyes were open.
- Startled, Ramos grabbed a VCR and fled the house.
- Later, Wagner's daughter-in-law discovered that items, including a microwave and a VCR, were missing from the home.
Procedural Posture:
- Edmond James Ramos was charged in a California trial court with five counts of first-degree burglary.
- At trial, the prosecution argued the November 23 entry constituted first-degree burglary but conceded subsequent entries were second-degree burglaries.
- The jury convicted Ramos of one count of first-degree burglary for the November 23 entry and two counts of second-degree burglary for other entries.
- Ramos (appellant) appealed his first-degree burglary conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Is a house considered an 'inhabited dwelling' for the purposes of a first-degree burglary conviction when its sole occupant is deceased at the time of the entry?
Opinions:
Majority - Vogel (Miriam A.), J.
No, a house is not an 'inhabited dwelling' when its sole occupant is deceased at the time of entry. The court reasoned that for a dwelling to be considered 'inhabited' under Penal Code § 459, it must be currently used for dwelling purposes, meaning an occupant is either present or temporarily absent with the intent to return. A deceased person is incapable of having an 'intent to return' and is not using the house for dwelling purposes. The court dismissed the prosecution's argument that the house was inhabited because the victim intended to remain there when he went to sleep, labeling it 'metaphysical sophistry' because at the time of the entry, the victim was dead and unable to form any intent. Therefore, the house was no longer 'occupied' as required for a first-degree burglary conviction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the meaning of 'inhabited dwelling' within California's burglary statute, establishing a bright-line rule that the death of a sole occupant terminates a dwelling's 'inhabited' status. The ruling prevents the elevation of a burglary charge to first degree based merely on the presence of a deceased resident, reinforcing that the statute's purpose is to protect occupants from the increased danger of violent confrontation. This precedent mandates that courts and prosecutors focus on the living occupant's 'intent to return' as the dispositive factor for determining habitation in cases of absence, which is logically impossible post-mortem.
