People v. Quattlebaum
675 N.Y.S.2d 585, 91 N.Y.2d 744, 698 N.E.2d 421 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
For a building to be considered a "dwelling" under the second-degree burglary statute, it must be "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night," a standard that is not met by rare or occasional overnight use of a space within a building that is primarily commercial in nature.
Facts:
- The building at issue is the Convent School of the Religious of the Sacred Heart in Manhattan, a seven-story structure primarily containing administrative offices, classrooms, a chapel, and employee lockers.
- On the fifth floor, one faculty office contained a bed, and another had a chair suitable for sleeping.
- A school administrator testified that the bed was "rarely" used for overnight stays, estimating between 20 to 30 occasions per year, typically when someone was working late or for a visiting priest.
- Defendant Barney was an employee with keys to the school, though his keys did not permit access to the first-floor offices.
- On June 6, 1993, a night when no one was staying overnight, Barney and his brother broke into two offices on the first floor and took various items.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Barney was convicted in the Supreme Court (the trial court) of two counts of burglary in the second degree.
- Barney, as the appellant, appealed the conviction to the Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the fifth-floor office was 'structurally adapted for overnight accommodation' and thus the school was a 'dwelling'.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) granted Barney leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does a school building that contains a fifth-floor office with a bed, which is used for overnight lodging only 20 to 30 times a year, constitute a "dwelling" for the purposes of the second-degree burglary statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Titone, J.
No. A school building with an office rarely used for sleeping is not a "dwelling" under the Penal Law. The statute defines a dwelling as a building "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night." The court reasoned that the school's primary character was commercial, not residential, and it lacked the customary indicia of a residence. Citing the infrequency of use—only 20 to 30 times a year—the court concluded this did not meet the standard of being "usually occupied." The court distinguished this case from precedents involving mixed-use buildings with dedicated residential apartments, noting that the existence of a bed in an office did not convert the entire commercial structure into a dwelling. To hold otherwise, the court argued, would improperly expand the definition of a dwelling to include any office with a couch, undermining the statute's purpose of providing enhanced protection against the "midnight terror" associated with home invasions.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and narrows the definition of a "dwelling" for the purposes of burglary statutes. It establishes that the primary character and customary use of a building are the determinative factors, rather than the mere possibility of occasional overnight lodging. The ruling prevents the over-extension of second-degree burglary charges to break-ins at commercial properties where overnight stays are incidental and infrequent. This precedent provides a clearer analytical framework for lower courts, emphasizing the need for regular, habitual lodging to elevate a building to the status of a dwelling, thereby reserving the enhanced penalty for invasions of genuinely residential spaces.
