People v. Price
472 N.Y.S.2d 206, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17287, 99 A.D.2d 878 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater one.
Facts:
- On May 23, 1981, at a carnival, Robert Pittman and Josephine Navarra saw the defendant and his friend steal a stuffed animal from Pittman's unattended booth.
- When Pittman and Navarra confronted the defendant, a fight ensued between the defendant and Robert Pittman.
- As the defendant was gaining the advantage, Robert Pittman's wife, Rose Pittman, attempted to pull the defendant off her husband.
- The defendant picked up a two-by-four board that was lying on the ground.
- He struck Rose Pittman on the head with the board.
- The blow caused a laceration that required 13 stitches to close.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was indicted by a grand jury on July 8, 1981, for assault in the second degree and petit larceny.
- At his arraignment in the County Court of Ulster County on July 15, 1981, the prosecution announced its readiness for trial.
- The defendant later moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming a denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial.
- The trial court held a hearing and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
- During the trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction for criminally negligent assault as a lesser included offense of second-degree assault, but the trial court denied the request.
- A jury found the defendant guilty of assault in the second degree and petit larceny, and a judgment was rendered on May 14, 1982.
- The defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to instruct a jury on criminally negligent assault as a lesser included offense of intentional assault when the defendant's actions—striking a person on the head with a two-by-four board—do not support a reasonable view that the act was merely negligent rather than intentional?
Opinions:
Majority - Mahoney, P. J.
No, a trial court does not err by refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense when no reasonable view of the evidence supports it. The court applied the two-tier test from People v. Glover. First, criminally negligent assault qualifies as a lesser included offense of intentional assault because the elements are identical except for the mental state, and a lower level of culpability is subsumed within a higher one. However, under the second tier of the test, there must be a reasonable view of the evidence for the jury to find the defendant committed the lesser but not the greater offense. Here, the act of picking up a two-by-four and striking someone on the head is inconsistent with the mental state of criminal negligence, which is a failure to perceive a risk. No evidence supports a conclusion that the defendant acted with anything less than the intent to cause physical injury. Therefore, the trial court was correct to deny the requested instruction. The court also found no speedy trial violation, as the prosecution had announced readiness in a timely manner and the subsequent delay was due to the 'exceptional circumstance' of a key witness being unavailable, during which the prosecution exercised due diligence to locate her.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the second prong of the test for submitting lesser included offenses to a jury, as established in People v. Glover. The decision reinforces that while a crime may theoretically be a lesser included offense based on its statutory elements, the specific facts of the case must provide a rational basis for the jury to acquit on the greater charge and convict on the lesser. This holding empowers trial judges to prevent jury speculation or compromise verdicts on charges not supported by the evidence. It underscores that a defendant's overt actions can be so indicative of a specific mental state (like intent) that they preclude a finding of a less culpable one (like negligence).
