People v. Prettyman
14 Cal. 4th 248, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
When the prosecution relies on the 'natural and probable consequences' doctrine to establish an accomplice's liability, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to identify and describe the specific, uncharged 'target' crime(s) that the defendant allegedly aided and abetted.
Facts:
- Debra Jane Bray and her codefendant, Richard D. Prettyman, were homeless individuals who presented themselves as a couple.
- On the evening before the murder, an intoxicated Bray argued with Prettyman.
- During the argument, Bray gave her wallet to Gaylord 'Vance' Van Camp for safekeeping to prevent Prettyman from taking it.
- In the early morning hours, a witness heard Bray repeatedly state, 'We are going to get that fucker Vance. He has no idea who he is messing with,' while Prettyman nodded and agreed.
- Shortly thereafter, another witness was awakened by thumping sounds and saw Prettyman leaving the area where Van Camp was sleeping, carrying a three-to-four-foot pipe.
- Immediately after Prettyman left, Bray approached this witness, telling him to leave and not to look at Van Camp.
- Prettyman later confessed to another individual that he had killed Van Camp with a metal pipe to retrieve Bray's wallet, which he found under Van Camp's head.
- Van Camp was found bludgeoned to death.
Procedural Posture:
- Debra Jane Bray and Richard D. Prettyman were charged in a California superior court (trial court) with murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
- A jury convicted both defendants of first-degree murder but acquitted them of conspiracy.
- The trial court sentenced Bray to a term of 25 years to life in prison.
- Bray, as appellant, appealed her conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, creating a conflict with another appellate decision on the issue of jury instructions.
- The Supreme Court of California granted Bray's petition for review to resolve the conflict between the courts of appeal.
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Issue:
When the prosecution relies on the 'natural and probable consequences' doctrine for accomplice liability, does a trial court have a sua sponte duty to identify and describe for the jury the potential uncharged target offenses the defendant may have aided and abetted?
Opinions:
Majority - Kennard, J.
Yes. When the prosecution’s theory of accomplice liability is based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the trial court must identify and describe the target crimes for the jury. The court reasoned that failing to do so creates a risk of the jury engaging in 'unguided speculation' about what conduct is criminal. Identifying the target crime facilitates the jury's primary task of determining whether the charged offense was a natural and probable consequence of a specific criminal act the defendant intended to aid. The court analogized this duty to the requirement in burglary cases to instruct on the specific felony the defendant intended to commit upon entry, as established in People v. Failla. In Bray's case, however, the court found the error was harmless because the prosecutor argued Bray was guilty of directly aiding and abetting the murder itself, not of aiding a lesser target offense, making it unlikely the jury relied on the flawed instruction.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
Agrees with the result but disagrees with the reasoning. Justice Mosk argued that a trial court generally need not instruct on uncharged target crimes, as it could burden the jury and misdirect its focus from the factual question of foreseeability to irrelevant legal definitions. The duty should only arise if there is a legitimate question as to whether the underlying conduct was criminal. He concluded that the trial court's error was not the failure to describe a target crime, but in giving the natural and probable consequences instruction at all, as it was inapplicable to the prosecution's theory; however, this error was harmless surplusage.
Concurring - Baxter, J.
Agrees with the result but clarifies the majority's holding. Justice Baxter emphasized that the duty to instruct on target offenses is not a true 'sua sponte' duty that arises in every case. Instead, it is triggered only when the prosecution expressly states its reliance on the natural and probable consequences doctrine and identifies the specific target offenses it wants the jury to consider. If the instruction is given by mistake, parties should be able to object and have it withdrawn.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Brown, J.
Concurs only in the judgment affirming the conviction but dissents from the majority's rationale. Justice Brown argued that the new instructional rule is unsupported and will confuse juries by distracting them from the central issue of causation. She asserted that the core of the natural and probable consequences doctrine is the causal nexus between the target act and the resulting crime, not the legal elements of the target offense. Therefore, an instruction on the target crime's elements is only necessary when the evidence suggests the defendant's conduct might have been noncriminal, which was not the case here.
Analysis:
This case resolves a conflict among California's appellate courts by establishing a mandatory instructional duty for trial courts in cases involving the natural and probable consequences doctrine. It requires the prosecution to be more specific about its theory of liability, forcing it to name a predicate 'target' crime, rather than relying on a generalized notion of criminal conduct. The decision enhances procedural safeguards for defendants by ensuring that juries have a clear legal framework for determining foreseeability, thereby reducing the risk of convictions based on 'unguided speculation.' However, it also places a new procedural burden on trial courts to provide these specific instructions whenever the doctrine is invoked.
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