People v. Powell
201 Mich. App. 516, 506 NW2d 894 (1993)
Rule of Law:
Under Michigan's rape-shield statute, evidence of a criminal sexual conduct victim's sexual conduct with third parties is generally inadmissible unless it is directly material to a consent defense or a motive for a false claim, and its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Separately, a search warrant affidavit based on information from a named crime victim is presumptively reliable, and minor technical omissions in explicitly identifying the victim as the source do not warrant suppression of evidence if a common-sense reading of the affidavit establishes the victim's personal knowledge.
Facts:
- The incident underlying the charges occurred on October 19, 1991.
- The victim, who had known the defendant for four to five years, was visiting him at his apartment.
- When the victim attempted to leave, the defendant prevented her from doing so.
- The defendant threatened the victim with a carved wooden club.
- The defendant sexually assaulted the victim.
- The defendant contended that the victim, whom he alleged was a prostitute, consented to sexual intercourse with him and then falsely accused him because he failed to pay her.
- The defendant sought to introduce testimony that a third party saw the victim walking with alleged prostitutes on a date prior to the assault, and saw her dancing topless at a local club after the incident.
- The defendant also sought to testify that approximately two months after the incident, he saw the victim standing on a corner, dressed in a short skirt, which he believed was an attempt to solicit prostitution.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with criminal sexual conduct.
- The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to admit evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with third parties.
- The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.
- The People appealed by leave granted to the Michigan Court of Appeals, challenging both orders.
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Issue:
1. Does the Michigan rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j, prohibit the admission of evidence concerning a criminal sexual conduct victim's employment as a topless dancer or alleged prostitution with third parties when the defendant claims consensual sexual intercourse in exchange for money? 2. Does a search warrant affidavit that thoroughly details a crime and names the complainant, but does not explicitly state the named complainant as the source of the detailed information, fail to establish probable cause under MCL 780.653, thereby requiring suppression of seized evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Corrigan, P.J.
1. No, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling admissible evidence regarding the victim’s employment as a topless dancer and allegations that she was a prostitute, as such evidence was either not material to the defense or more prejudicial than probative under the rape-shield statute. The Michigan rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j, generally prohibits evidence of a sexual assault victim's past sexual conduct with third parties and her sexual reputation, recognizing that such evidence is typically irrelevant to the victim's veracity or consent with the defendant. Exceptions are limited to evidence of the defendant's past sexual conduct with the victim, or specific instances showing the source of semen, pregnancy, or disease, if material and not unduly prejudicial. While such evidence may be admissible to show a victim's bias or motive for filing a false claim, the evidence presented here—topless dancing or vague associations with alleged prostitutes—was not material to the defendant's specific claim of consensual sex-for-money with him on the date of the incident. The court found that employment as a topless dancer does not equate to prostitution, and the proffered evidence amounted to an attempt to malign the victim’s character, which the statute explicitly aims to prevent. It was deemed considerably more prejudicial than probative, especially given the questionable reliability and temporal distance of some of the defendant's evidence. 2. No, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence obtained from the search warrant because a common-sense reading of the affidavit established the named crime victim as the reliable source of the information, satisfying MCL 780.653. The affidavit, prepared by an experienced police sergeant, identified the complainant by name and provided highly specific, self-authenticating details of the crime, including the location of physical evidence. A named crime victim is presumptively reliable, unlike an unnamed underworld informant, and is not subject to the stricter credibility requirements of Aguilar/Spinelli. The specific details in the affidavit inherently established the victim's personal knowledge and the information's reliability. Furthermore, in a separate section, Presiding Judge Corrigan argued that a remand to reconstruct any oral testimony presented to the magistrate would be appropriate, as the Fourth Amendment does not mandate written sworn statements for probable cause. The opinion emphasized that suppression of evidence is a severe, judge-made remedy intended to deter constitutional violations, and it should not be applied for mere technical statutory violations, particularly when the officer acted in good faith and the Fourth Amendment itself was not offended. Applying the exclusionary rule for minor drafting imperfections in these circumstances would be disproportionate and would undermine public respect for the legal process. Shepherd, J., concurred with parts I and II only.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - McDonald, J.
I concur with part I of Judge Corrigan’s opinion regarding the inadmissibility of evidence pertaining to the victim’s prior conduct. However, I respectfully dissent from the balance of the opinion concerning the suppression of evidence. The People conceded that the search warrant affidavit failed to satisfy the mandatory and unambiguous requirements of MCL 780.653. This statute requires that probable cause "shall be based upon all the facts related within the affidavit" and, if the source is unnamed, must contain affirmative allegations of personal knowledge, credibility, or reliability. Even though the affidavit contained thorough details and it appeared obvious the information came from the named victim, the statute requires this information to be contained within the written affidavit. According to established Supreme Court precedent in People v Sherbine, a violation of this statutory requirement necessitates the suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid warrant. I believe that courts are not at liberty to disregard the clear directives of the Supreme Court, even when the remedy of suppression seems harsh.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of Michigan's rape-shield statute, affirming that general character attacks on a victim's sexual history are inadmissible, even under a consent defense, unless highly specific and directly material to the specific incident or a motive for fabrication. It also provides crucial guidance on the interpretation of search warrant affidavit requirements, favoring a 'common-sense' approach that presumes the reliability of identified crime victims and disfavors the suppression of evidence for technical drafting errors that do not offend the Fourth Amendment. The majority's robust discussion, particularly from P.J. Corrigan, challenges the automatic application of the exclusionary rule for statutory violations, indicating a potential shift towards a good-faith exception in such contexts, which could impact how procedural errors are remedied in future cases.
