People v. Pena
149 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 14, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 2472, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
The common law defense of duress is available for all non-capital criminal charges, including driving under the influence, and may be predicated on a defendant's reasonable belief that their illegal action was necessary to prevent imminent harm to a third party.
Facts:
- At approximately 4 a.m., Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Frank Webb encountered Russell Pena and his girlfriend, Sara Marrufo, asleep in a parked car.
- Webb ordered both individuals out of the car, smelled alcohol on Pena, and conducted what he termed a "weapons search."
- During the search of Marrufo, who was wearing a fur coat over a see-through teddy for a Halloween costume, Webb ordered her to open her coat and examined her body with a flashlight.
- Webb then ordered Marrufo into his patrol vehicle, stating he would take her home for her "protection," and left Pena at the scene with the car, which belonged to Marrufo's sister.
- Pena, who had been drinking earlier, testified that he feared for Marrufo's physical safety after witnessing Webb's search.
- Believing Marrufo was in danger, Pena followed Webb's patrol car.
- Marrufo testified that Webb stopped at one point, saw Pena following, and stated that Pena "would be made sorry" for doing so.
- After Webb arrived at Marrufo's residence, he located Pena sitting in the car with the motor running and arrested him for driving under the influence.
Procedural Posture:
- Russell Pena was charged by complaint in municipal court with driving under the influence, failure to have a driver's license, and possession of marijuana.
- The license and marijuana charges were dismissed on the prosecution's motion.
- Pena's first jury trial on the DUI charge resulted in a mistrial after the jury became hopelessly deadlocked.
- During the first trial's deliberations, the jury requested an instruction on the defense of justification, which the court denied.
- A second jury trial was held, where Pena again requested an instruction on his defense theory that he drove to protect his girlfriend.
- The trial court refused to give the requested instruction.
- The jury found Pena guilty of driving under the influence.
- Pena, as appellant, appealed the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct a jury on the defense of duress in a DUI prosecution where the defendant presents evidence that he drove only because he reasonably feared for the physical safety of a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Bernstein, J.
Yes. A trial court commits reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress when a defendant presents evidence supporting that theory, as the defense is available for all non-capital crimes and can be based on protecting a third party from perceived harm. The defense of duress is not limited by statute to threats against the defendant's own life but is a broader common law defense applicable when a person commits a lesser evil to avoid a greater harm. It applies to any crime except a capital offense, including driving under the influence. The court reasoned that the law should not criminalize the actions of those who intervene to protect others. Because Pena presented evidence that he drove while intoxicated only out of a reasonable fear for his girlfriend's safety at the hands of the deputy, he was entitled to have the jury consider whether his actions were justified under the defense of duress.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for establishing in California that the common law defense of duress or necessity can be applied to a strict liability offense like driving under the influence. It also clarifies that the defense is not limited to situations where the defendant's own life is threatened, but extends to protecting third parties from perceived imminent harm. This precedent requires trial courts to provide a jury instruction on duress whenever a defendant presents sufficient evidence to support the theory, broadening the scope of available defenses in criminal prosecutions. It affirms that the jury, as the trier of fact, must be allowed to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's belief and actions in such circumstances.
