People v. Patterson
778 P.2d 549 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
When a statute criminalizes multiple distinct acts, a court determining if a felony is inherently dangerous for the second-degree felony-murder rule must analyze the specific offense committed in the abstract, not the statute as a whole. An inherently dangerous felony is one that carries a high probability that its commission will result in death.
Facts:
- Victim Jennie Licerio and her friend Carmen Lopez were daily cocaine users.
- On the night of November 25, 1985, Licerio and Lopez were in defendant Patterson's motel room.
- Patterson furnished cocaine to both women.
- All three individuals drank alcohol, inhaled lines of cocaine, and smoked cigarettes containing a mixture of tobacco and cocaine.
- Licerio became ill after ingesting the cocaine.
- Lopez called for an ambulance, but paramedics were unable to revive Licerio.
- Licerio's cause of death was determined to be acute cocaine intoxication.
Procedural Posture:
- The People charged Patterson in a California trial court with murder and several drug offenses, including three counts of violating Health and Safety Code § 11352.
- The prosecution's theory for the murder charge was based solely on the second-degree felony-murder doctrine, with the violation of § 11352 as the underlying felony.
- The trial court, on its own motion, dismissed the murder charge, finding that a violation of § 11352 is not inherently dangerous to human life.
- After the dismissal, Patterson entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the three counts of violating § 11352.
- The People, as appellant, appealed the dismissal of the murder charge to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal, reasoning it was compelled to analyze § 11352 as a whole and found it was not inherently dangerous.
- The California Supreme Court granted the People's petition for review.
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Issue:
When determining if an underlying felony is inherently dangerous for purposes of the second-degree felony-murder rule, must a court consider the statute defining the felony in its entirety, or may it analyze only the specific offense committed by the defendant when the statute proscribes multiple, distinct forms of conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Kennard, J.
No. When a statute proscribes multiple, distinct offenses that do not share a single primary element, a court may analyze the specific offense committed by the defendant, in the abstract, to determine if it is inherently dangerous. The court held that Health and Safety Code § 11352, which includes various acts from transporting to administering drugs, lacks a single primary element. Therefore, the inquiry should focus only on the crime of 'furnishing cocaine' in the abstract, rather than all possible violations of the statute. The court further held that for a felony to be 'inherently dangerous to life,' it must be an offense carrying 'a high probability' that death will result, a standard adopted from the definition of implied malice. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine if furnishing cocaine meets this standard.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Lucas, C. J.
Yes, in part. The Chief Justice concurred with the majority's conclusion that the court should analyze the specific offense of furnishing cocaine rather than the entire statute. However, he dissented strongly from the majority's new definition of 'inherently dangerous' as requiring a 'high probability of death.' He argued this standard is 'unrealistic, unwise and unprecedented,' will be practically impossible to meet for any drug-furnishing offense, and effectively guts the second-degree felony-murder doctrine in this context. He advocated for the previously used 'substantial risk of death' standard.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mosk, J.
Yes. The dissent argued that precedent requires viewing the statutory definition of the offense as a whole. Justice Mosk contended that Health and Safety Code § 11352 does have a primary element—trafficking in illegal narcotics—and because the statute can be violated in nonhazardous ways (e.g., transporting a small amount for personal use), it cannot be considered inherently dangerous in the abstract. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of the murder charge was correct. He concurred, however, with the majority's adoption of the 'high probability of death' standard for future cases.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Panelli, J.
Yes. Justice Panelli joined Justice Mosk's dissent, agreeing that the statute should be viewed as a whole. He wrote separately to express profound 'uneasiness' with the entire judicially-created second-degree felony-murder rule, suggesting it is a nonstatutory crime that oversteps the court's constitutional authority. He argued that defining such crimes and their punishments is a task for the Legislature, not the judiciary.
Analysis:
This decision significantly refines the 'in the abstract' test for the second-degree felony-murder rule. By allowing courts to parse multi-offense statutes, it prevents the doctrine from being undermined by legislative drafting choices that group both dangerous and non-dangerous acts together. However, the adoption of the stringent 'high probability of death' standard simultaneously restricts the doctrine's scope, making it much more difficult for prosecutors to secure murder convictions for deaths resulting from felonies like furnishing drugs. The case thus represents a judicial compromise, narrowing the rule in one respect while creating a pathway for its application in another, albeit with a higher evidentiary burden.
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