People v. Palomar
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION (2020)
Rule of Law:
Implied malice murder can be established by a single-punch assault if aggravating circumstances demonstrate that the defendant's act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, was performed with knowledge that it endangered another's life and with conscious disregard for that life.
Facts:
- Erik Wolting and Gregory Rustigian went to a bar where Rustigian consumed about 10 beers and appeared "pretty buzzed" or "very intoxicated."
- Rustigian made "derogatory" remarks about Mexicans to Rosa Lopez, visibly upsetting her.
- Ignacio Franco Palomar III, Rosa Lopez's cousin, was inside the bar, appeared angered by Rustigian's comments, and told a bouncer, "I'm gonna fuck homeboy up."
- Rosa Lopez's sister, Victoria Lopez, warned Wolting and Rustigian that they were "going to get jumped" when they left the bar, but Rustigian, confident in his 225-pound build, laughed off the warning.
- As Wolting and Rustigian walked about 50 feet from the bar on a public street, Palomar III surreptitiously approached them from behind in the dark.
- Without warning, Palomar III punched Rustigian once in the face with "incredibly powerful" force, causing Rustigian to become unconscious while standing and fall backward.
- The back of Rustigian's head struck the edge of a concrete curb, making a sound like "a watermelon being dropped off a building."
- Palomar III immediately turned around and walked away without checking on Rustigian or securing emergency assistance.
- Rustigian suffered multiple skull fractures and a severe brain injury, dying from blunt-force head injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Ignacio Franco Palomar III was charged with second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County.
- A jury convicted Ignacio Franco Palomar III of second-degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189).
- The trial court found true allegations that he had been convicted of two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two prior serious or violent felonies under California’s “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
- The trial court dismissed one of the two strikes.
- The trial court sentenced Palomar III to an aggregate term of 40 years to life.
- Palomar III (defendant and appellant) appealed the judgment, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of implied malice.
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Issue:
Is there sufficient evidence to support a finding of implied malice for second-degree murder when a defendant delivers a single powerful, unwarned punch to an intoxicated victim, causing the victim to fall and strike their head on a concrete surface, even without a protracted prior assault?
Opinions:
Majority - Yegan, Acting P. J.
Yes, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of implied malice for second-degree murder, as the specific circumstances surrounding the single powerful punch to an intoxicated victim who then fell and struck his head on concrete demonstrate both the physical and mental components of implied malice. The physical component, requiring an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to life, was satisfied by aggravating circumstances: Palomar III targeted an obviously intoxicated and vulnerable victim, delivered an "incredibly powerful" punch that knocked Rustigian unconscious before impact, ensuring a fall onto a hard concrete surface, and delivered a "sucker punch" without warning. The court relied on People v. Cravens (2012) and People v. Efstathiou (1941), emphasizing that the key factors for implied malice in such cases are the victim's extreme vulnerability, the powerful sucker punch, and the concrete surface, not necessarily a protracted prior assault. The mental component, requiring conscious disregard for life, was inferred from Palomar III's behavior before and after the attack; his prior threat, "I'm gonna fuck homeboy up," and his immediate departure without rendering aid, despite the audible impact of Rustigian's head and visible injuries, demonstrated a callous indifference to human life. The court concluded that these facts were even "more egregious" than the cited precedents due to the deadly stealth nature, potential racial animus, and explicit intent to attack.
Concurring - Tangeman, J.
Yes, I concur with the majority's conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to support the second-degree murder conviction in this case. I agree with the majority opinion and its rationale regarding the outcome, and affirm that People v. Cravens (2012) is binding precedent that must be followed. However, I disagree with the majority's statement that the facts here are "more egregious" than those in Cravens. While acknowledging the difficulty in reconciling these facts with a finding of a "high probability that it will result in death," I find that the additional facts surrounding the group assault in Cravens are not sufficient to distinguish it from this case for the purposes of applying the implied malice doctrine.
Dissenting - Perren, J.
No, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of implied malice for second-degree murder, because the facts of this case do not meet the "outer bounds of conduct sufficiently dangerous" established by People v. Cravens (2012) for implied malice. I respectfully disagree with the majority's pairing of the facts, arguing that Cravens involved far more than a single punch; it was a "protracted assault by a group of men" including threats, a chase, beating, and kicking that left the victim "virtually helpless" before the final punch. In contrast, this case involved a single punch after a verbal altercation between combatants of roughly the same size, standing on a flat surface. The dissent argues that in single-punch cases, "something in addition to the blow is required," which was present in Cravens but absent here. Implied malice requires an act with a "high probability that it will result in death" and an "awareness of the risk of death," not just serious bodily injury. Appellant's conduct, while reprehensible, falls outside the boundary of conduct sufficiently dangerous to support a finding of implied malice murder, making it more akin to manslaughter.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces and potentially expands the application of implied malice murder in California, particularly for "single-punch" fatalities. It clarifies that a protracted group assault, as described in Cravens, is not a prerequisite for finding implied malice when other aggravating factors are present. The decision emphasizes the aggressor's subjective awareness of the risk of death, inferred from surrounding circumstances like the victim's vulnerability, the nature of the blow, and the impact surface. This broadens the scope of conduct that can be prosecuted as second-degree implied malice murder, potentially leading to more severe charges in one-punch death cases where such aggravating factors exist.
