People v. Palomar
1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2394, 171 Cal.App.3d 131, 214 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1985)
Rule of Law:
When a statute is enacted with an immediate effective date but explicitly states a later operative date, the later operative date controls when the statute's provisions substantially affect individual rights, and thus, the statute cannot be retroactively applied to offenses committed before that operative date.
Facts:
- Palacios committed the offense of forgery on or about October 31, 1983.
- In 1983, the Legislature enacted comprehensive legislation as part of the Crime Victim Restitution Program, which added Penal Code section 1202.4.
- This legislation, including Penal Code section 1202.4, was adopted as an urgency measure and filed with the Secretary of State on September 27, 1983, making it 'into effect' immediately.
- The legislation, however, explicitly provided that the entire act 'shall become operative January 1, 1984.'
- Penal Code section 1202.4 mandates the imposition of a 'restitution fine' in any case where a defendant is convicted of a felony.
Procedural Posture:
- Palacios pleaded guilty to the count of forgery in the trial court.
- The trial court sentenced Palacios to 16 months in state prison and ordered him to pay a $1,000 restitution fine.
- Palacios appealed from the part of the judgment imposing the restitution fine to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.
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Issue:
Does Penal Code section 1202.4, which was enacted with an immediate effective date but specified a later operative date, apply to an offense committed during the period between its effective date and its operative date?
Opinions:
Majority - Blease, J.
No, Penal Code section 1202.4 does not apply to an offense committed during the period between its effective date and its operative date. The court held that while the act containing Penal Code section 1202.4 became 'effective' immediately upon its enactment on September 27, 1983, due to an urgency clause, the legislation explicitly deferred its 'operative' date to January 1, 1984, for the entire act. Citing People v. Henderson (1980), the court reasoned that an enactment is a law on its effective date only in the sense that it cannot be changed except by legislative process; the rights of individuals under its provisions are not substantially affected until the provision operates as law. The court rejected the Attorney General's argument to disregard the operative date as a legislative mistake, emphasizing that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1858, judges must ascertain what is contained in a statute and not omit what has been inserted. The court found no conflict between the urgency and operative clauses, as the urgency clause effectively put into motion the entire act, including its specified later operative date. Therefore, Penal Code section 1202.4 did not affect individual rights until January 1, 1984, and cannot be retroactively applied to Palacios's offense committed on October 31, 1983.
Analysis:
This case establishes a crucial distinction between the 'effective date' and 'operative date' of a statute, particularly when an urgency clause dictates immediate effectiveness while a separate clause sets a later operative date. It reinforces the principle that statutes affecting individual rights, especially penal ones, are generally applied prospectively, only affecting conduct occurring after they become fully operative. The ruling also underscores judicial deference to the literal text of legislative enactments, even when the underlying legislative intent for such a dual dating scheme might seem unclear, thus limiting judicial discretion to 'correct' perceived legislative errors. This decision provides a protective precedent for defendants against the retroactive application of new penalties under laws that had not yet substantially come into force.
