People v. Palmer
15 P.3d 234, 24 Cal. 4th 856, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The 'rule of consistency,' which holds that the acquittal of all but one alleged coconspirator requires the acquittal of the remaining defendant, is no longer a valid legal doctrine in California. A conviction for conspiracy can be upheld, even if inconsistent with the acquittal of all other alleged coconspirators, as long as the conviction is supported by substantial evidence.
Facts:
- On December 11, 1996, Donald Edmond Price was driving a car with 15-year-old Floyd Maurice Palmer in the passenger seat.
- Price drove alongside a car driven by Richard Humphries, and Palmer fired a .25-caliber handgun, grazing Humphries's scalp.
- When Humphries tried to flee, Price pursued him, allowing Palmer to fire a second shot at Humphries's car.
- A couple of hours later, Price, driving a stolen truck with Palmer, deliberately sideswiped a BMW driven by Judith Showalter.
- After both cars stopped, Palmer approached Showalter's car, said, "take this, bitch," and shot her in the head.
- Price and Palmer then stole Showalter's purse and pager, pulled her from the vehicle, and fled in her BMW.
- Price later testified that he and Palmer had agreed to rob Showalter, but he denied knowing Palmer would shoot her.
- Palmer testified that Price gave him the gun and forced him to shoot both Humphries and Showalter.
Procedural Posture:
- The prosecution charged Donald Edmond Price and Floyd Maurice Palmer jointly with crimes including conspiracy to murder Judith Showalter and attempted murder of Richard Humphries.
- The trial court ordered a joint trial but impaneled two separate juries, one for each defendant.
- Price’s jury found him guilty of conspiracy to murder Showalter and found that the attempted murder of Humphries was premeditated.
- Palmer’s jury found him not guilty of conspiracy to murder Showalter and found that the attempted murder of Humphries was not premeditated.
- Price (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing his conspiracy conviction and the premeditation finding must be reversed due to the inconsistent verdicts returned by Palmer's jury.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed Price’s conviction, holding that the rule of consistency does not apply to defendants tried by separate juries.
- The California Supreme Court granted Price's petition for review on the issue of the inconsistent verdicts.
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Issue:
Does the 'rule of consistency' require the reversal of a defendant's conspiracy conviction when his only alleged coconspirator was acquitted of the same conspiracy charge by a separate jury in a joint trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Chin, J.
No. The rule of consistency is a vestige of the past with no continuing validity, and an inconsistent verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting aside a conviction supported by substantial evidence. The court reasoned that inconsistent verdicts are an inevitable consequence of a system that allows for jury lenity, compromise, or simply different interpretations of evidence by different fact-finders. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in cases like United States v. Powell, the court held that the proper safeguard against jury irrationality is not a rule requiring consistent outcomes, but rather the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence by trial and appellate courts. The historical basis for the rule—the inability of early appellate courts to review the evidentiary record—has vanished, making the rule obsolete. Therefore, as long as substantial evidence supports Price's conviction, it may stand despite the logically inconsistent acquittal of his sole coconspirator, Palmer.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
No. The rule of consistency should be abandoned, but the analysis should not end with a simple sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. He distinguished between inconsistent verdicts from a single jury versus multiple juries and argued that in either scenario, the reviewing court should determine if mistake, compromise, or nullification had a marginal effect on the inconsistent conviction. He reasoned that while sufficiency of evidence asks if any rational jury could convict, the real question is whether the actual jury did so for improper reasons. In this case, however, there is nothing in the record to suggest such an error; the inconsistency is more likely explained by Palmer's jury showing lenity toward a 15-year-old defendant, which does not invalidate the verdict against the 29-year-old Price.
Analysis:
This decision formally abolishes the common law 'rule of consistency' in California, aligning the state with the modern federal approach to inconsistent verdicts. The ruling solidifies the principle that jury verdicts are to be reviewed for evidentiary sufficiency on an individual basis, without regard to the outcomes for codefendants. This enhances the finality of jury verdicts and limits defendants' ability to appeal convictions based on logical inconsistencies arising from multi-defendant trials. Future cases involving conspiracy or vicarious liability will now focus solely on whether the evidence supports each individual conviction, rather than on whether the verdicts are logically consistent with one another.
