People v. Olivas
1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2577, 172 Cal. App. 3d 984, 218 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985)
Rule of Law:
Vehicular homicide can constitute second-degree murder based on implied malice when a person, knowing their conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life; this determination is made on a case-by-case basis, and not all factors present in prior precedent are necessary for a finding of implied malice.
Facts:
- On October 12, 1983, David Jesse Olivas stole a new Oldsmobile from an automobile dealership.
- At approximately 6:10 p.m., a police officer observed Olivas driving 49 mph in a 30 mph zone in San Jose.
- Olivas then led police on a high-speed chase, reaching speeds between 50 mph and 100 mph on city streets with 25 mph and 30 mph speed limits, covering 1.9 miles in two and a half minutes.
- During the chase, Olivas ran four stop signs and three red lights, struck the fender of a stopped car, narrowly missed a collision with two other cars, and evaded police attempts to block or disable his vehicle.
- The chase concluded when Olivas ran a stop sign at 57 mph in a 25 mph zone and struck Lorraine Martinez's vehicle broadside.
- The collision killed Lorraine Martinez's nine-month-old child, William Martinez, Jr., who was strapped in an infant seat.
- Lorraine Martinez sustained serious injuries to her bladder, spleen, bowel, pelvis, and head, and suffered a miscarriage, requiring a month-long hospitalization.
- A blood sample taken from Olivas at 7:54 p.m. revealed .02 percent blood alcohol and .04 parts per million of PCP, and his eyes exhibited nystagmus, indicating PCP use.
Procedural Posture:
- An information charged Olivas with murder (Pen. Code, § 187), vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 3), driving under the influence and causing death (Veh. Code, § 23153), driving under the influence and causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153), and driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851).
- The information also alleged four prior felony convictions, and an amended information added an allegation of a prior prison term.
- Olivas waived a jury trial in the trial court (court of first instance) in exchange for the promise of a maximum prison term of no more than 15 years to life.
- The trial court found Olivas guilty on all five counts, declaring the murder to be in the second degree.
- Olivas admitted three of the prior felony allegations.
- The trial court sentenced Olivas to a term of 15 years to life for murder and stayed sentencing on all remaining matters.
- Olivas appealed the judgment of conviction for second degree murder to the California Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Is there sufficient evidence of implied malice to sustain a second-degree murder conviction for a vehicular homicide committed under the influence of PCP, where the defendant engaged in a high-speed chase, disregarded traffic laws, and had multiple close calls, even absent proof of prior intent to drive while intoxicated or a near-fatal warning collision?
Opinions:
Majority - King, J.
Yes, there was sufficient evidence of implied malice to support a second-degree murder conviction for the vehicular homicide. The court applied the principles from People v. Watson, which established that vehicular homicide committed while intoxicated involves implied malice if a person, knowing their conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life. This standard is distinct from vehicular manslaughter, which requires only gross negligence or a conscious indifference to the consequences (i.e., 'I don’t care what happens,' versus 'I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed'). The court rejected Olivas's argument that Watson required two specific factors—planning to drive while intoxicated and a pre-accident near-fatal close call—to be present in all cases. The court clarified that Watson merely found these factors sufficient in that specific case, not universally necessary. Here, Olivas's pre-accident collision, though minor, was certainly sufficient to apprise him of the risk, and his subsequent near-collisions further demonstrated his awareness of the danger. Even without evidence that Olivas took PCP knowing he would later drive, the other overwhelming facts—driving a stolen car at extremely high speeds through city streets, running multiple traffic signals, evading police, and multiple close calls—demonstrated that he was acting deliberately with conscious disregard for a known, life-threatening risk at the time of the fatal accident. The court emphasized that Watson deliberately declined to prescribe a rigid formula for vehicular homicide cases, instead advocating for a case-by-case approach. The trier of fact did not err in implying malice and convicting Olivas of second-degree murder.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of People v. Watson regarding implied malice in vehicular homicide. It establishes that the factors identified in Watson are illustrative examples of sufficient evidence, rather than a mandatory checklist. This flexible, case-by-case approach allows courts to consider the totality of circumstances, ensuring that defendants who exhibit a conscious disregard for human life through their actions, even without specific prior intent or a near-fatal warning, can be held accountable for second-degree murder. The ruling reinforces that the critical inquiry is the defendant's state of mind during the dangerous conduct itself, rather than strict adherence to a factual pattern from prior cases, potentially broadening the scope of what constitutes implied malice in vehicular crimes.
