People v. Nieto Benitez
4 Cal. 4th 91, 840 P.2d 969, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The act of brandishing a firearm, depending on the specific circumstances, can be sufficiently dangerous to human life to support a conviction for second-degree murder based on an implied malice theory, even if the underlying offense is a misdemeanor and the death was accidental.
Facts:
- On July 8, 1989, Martin Nieto Benitez was eating dinner near a catering truck when a plate of food, thrown during horseplay between Güero (Lorenzo Lopez Mena) and Caballo, struck Benitez on the back of his head, staining his shirt.
- Benitez became angry, confronted Güero and Caballo, and asked who would wash his shirt; Güero refused, stating it was an accident, and an argument ensued.
- During the argument, Güero challenged Benitez to "bring a gun or knife," and Benitez responded, "It's going to be an accident if a bullet goes off and hits one of you, too."
- Benitez went to his nearby apartment, obtained a handgun and extra ammunition, and returned to the catering truck, concealing the weapon.
- Benitez initiated another confrontation with Güero, who was holding a broomstick, again asking who would wash his shirt; Güero replied no one would, and Benitez then said, "Well, then one of you two is going to leave."
- After further argument, Güero dropped his broomstick and lunged toward Benitez as if to grab or punch him.
- As Güero lunged forward, Benitez drew the firearm from his waistband with his finger on the trigger, and the weapon fired, striking Güero in the neck, causing a mortal wound.
Procedural Posture:
- The prosecutor, in closing argument, asked the jury to return a verdict of first degree murder, while defense counsel argued for manslaughter.
- The trial court instructed the jury consistent with the parties' theories, including CALJIC No. 8.31 for second-degree murder based on implied malice.
- During deliberations, the jury submitted an inquiry asking for an explanation of the term, "intentional act," as used in CALJIC No. 8.31.
- The trial court responded by informing the jury that "the pulling of a handgun in the manner described and/or the shooting of the handgun in the manner described are possible acts for your consideration."
- The jury returned a verdict finding Martin Nieto Benitez guilty of second-degree murder with implied malice and found true the allegation that he had used a firearm.
- The trial court denied Benitez's motion for new trial and his motion to modify the verdict to involuntary manslaughter, sentencing him to 17 years to life in state prison.
- Benitez appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, contending the trial court committed instructional error by allowing implied malice to be based solely on drawing a firearm, arguing it was a misdemeanor and could only support manslaughter.
- A majority in the Court of Appeal agreed with Benitez, holding that the intentional brandishing of a handgun, as a matter of law, could not support a finding of malice, and reversed his conviction.
- The People petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, contending the Court of Appeal erred in finding instructional error.
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Issue:
Does the act of brandishing a firearm, in the specific circumstances of a case, constitute an "intentional act" whose "natural consequences are dangerous to human life," sufficient to establish implied malice for second-degree murder, even if the brandishing itself is a misdemeanor and the resulting death was unintentional?
Opinions:
Majority - George, J.
Yes, the act of brandishing a firearm may constitute an act sufficiently dangerous to life to support a conviction of second degree murder on an implied malice theory, depending on the specific circumstances. The Court of Appeal erred by concluding that the intentional brandishing of a handgun, as a matter of law, could not support a finding of implied malice. The trial court's instructions correctly left it to the jury to determine whether, under all the circumstances, the natural consequences of Benitez's brandishing of the firearm were dangerous to human life, and whether he acted with knowledge of the danger and conscious disregard for life. The court distinguished the analysis for implied malice murder from the felony-murder rule, explaining that for implied malice, the jury considers the specific facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct, rather than examining the underlying act (e.g., brandishing a firearm) "in the abstract" for inherent dangerousness. It affirmed that an unlawful killing resulting from a misdemeanor can still be murder if committed with malice, provided implied malice is shown. The court also clarified that CALJIC No. 8.31, which defines implied malice based on "natural consequences... dangerous to life," correctly states the law and is equivalent to the "high probability of death" standard from People v. Watson, declining to recommend modification of the instruction.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
Yes, Justice Mosk generally concurs with the majority that brandishing a firearm can support implied malice second-degree murder. However, he expresses concern that, in certain cases, juries might misinterpret the standard CALJIC instructions (Nos. 8.11 and 8.31) on implied malice. He notes that while the Supreme Court has declared the "natural consequences dangerous to human life" language synonymous with "high probability that it will result in death" (People v. Watson), a lay juror might not readily understand this equivalence. Justice Mosk suggests that the "high probability of death" language is clearer and more forthright, and encourages trial courts to use this more explicit formulation to avoid potential jury confusion and subsequent reversals of judgments of conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standard for implied malice in second-degree murder, particularly regarding acts that might also constitute misdemeanors. It firmly rejects the idea that a court must evaluate the underlying act "in the abstract" when determining implied malice, a standard reserved for the felony-murder rule. Instead, juries must consider all the specific circumstances surrounding the defendant's actions to determine if they posed a danger to life and if the defendant acted with conscious disregard for that danger. This ruling broadens the scope of conduct that can support an implied malice murder charge, emphasizing the specific context of the defendant's actions over the formal classification of an underlying offense.
