People v. Nesler
16 Cal. 4th 561 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Juror misconduct, specifically the receipt and deliberate interjection of extraneous information into deliberations, gives rise to a presumption of prejudice that requires reversal if there is a substantial likelihood that the juror was actually biased and unable to render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial.
Facts:
- Daniel Driver allegedly raped Ellena Starr Nesler's seven-year-old son, W., at a Christian camp, and Driver threatened W. and his family if he disclosed the abuse.
- Several months later, W. disclosed the abuse to Nesler, leading to a complaint being filed against Driver in May 1989.
- Driver fled and was not apprehended until late 1992 or early 1993; during this period, W. developed hypervigilance and once was found with a gun, prompting Nesler, who had also been raped as a child, to seek counseling for him.
- Nesler expressed extreme anxiety about W. having to face Driver at the preliminary hearing in April 1993, requesting alternatives or a closed hearing.
- On the morning of Driver's preliminary hearing, W. was vomiting, and Nesler appeared very anxious; when Driver arrived at the courthouse, he grinned with a mean, haughty look at W., causing Nesler to lunge at him but be restrained by her sister.
- Just before she was called to testify, Nesler asked an investigator if district attorney employees would get in trouble if 'something happened' to Driver.
- During a break in the preliminary hearing, while the judge was absent, Nesler took a gun from her sister's purse and shot Daniel Driver five times in the head and neck, killing him instantly.
- After being taken into custody, Nesler claimed Driver 'raped hundreds of boys' and later admitted to using methamphetamine that morning, stating W.'s pain had destroyed her sense of right and wrong.
Procedural Posture:
- Ellena Starr Nesler was charged with murder.
- A jury found Nesler not guilty of first or second degree murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, with a firearm use enhancement, during the guilt phase.
- The jury then proceeded to the sanity phase of the trial and found Nesler sane at the time of the offense.
- Nesler moved for a new trial, on both guilt and sanity issues, alleging juror misconduct by Juror Katherine Elizabeth Boje.
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the new trial motion, made findings (including that Boje made a derogatory post-verdict comment about Nesler, stating she received what she deserved), and denied the motion, finding no prejudice.
- Nesler appealed to the Court of Appeal, challenging the denial of her new trial motion due to juror misconduct.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed Nesler's conviction, agreeing that the presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct was rebutted.
- The California Supreme Court granted review, limiting the issue to be argued to that of juror misconduct.
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Issue:
Does a juror's receipt and repeated interjection of extraneous, prejudicial information during deliberations, in an apparent attempt to influence other jurors, create a substantial likelihood of actual bias, thus rendering the presumption of prejudice unrebutted and requiring a new trial on the issue of sanity?
Opinions:
Majority - George, C. J.
Yes, a juror's receipt and repeated interjection of extraneous, prejudicial information during deliberations, especially when used to influence other jurors' views, does create a substantial likelihood of actual bias, requiring reversal of the sanity verdict. The court emphasized a defendant's constitutional right to a trial by unbiased, impartial jurors whose verdict relies solely on trial evidence. Juror misconduct, such as receiving outside information, presumes prejudice. This bias can arise if the material is inherently prejudicial or if, based on the misconduct and circumstances, a juror was 'actually biased.' The court performed an independent review, accepting the trial court’s historical facts that Juror Boje intentionally listened to damaging information about Nesler from a stranger in a bar, failed to disclose it, and then repeatedly used this information during deliberations to challenge other jurors' views on Nesler's parenting and drug use. These issues were central to expert testimony on Nesler's sanity. Boje's knowing violation of instructions and proactive attempts to sway others with outside information, including a derogatory post-verdict comment she made about Nesler, demonstrated a state of mind that prevented impartiality. The court distinguished this case from 'passive' misconduct or disclosure to non-jurors in previous rulings, finding Boje's active use of the information to influence fellow jurors strongly indicated actual bias. Because the misconduct occurred during the sanity phase, the prejudice is limited to that verdict, necessitating a new trial on sanity.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
Yes, Juror Boje's misconduct created a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted, thus entitling Nesler to a new trial on the question of sanity. Justice Mosk concurred with the judgment, agreeing that Boje's misconduct, including her failure to disclose and her active use of extraneous information during deliberations, gives rise to a presumption of prejudice. He interpreted the legal standard from In re Carpenter to mean that a verdict will be set aside unless there is no substantial likelihood of juror bias. He concluded that it was impossible to definitively determine whether Boje was actually influenced by what she heard or was merely attempting to influence other jurors with the outside information. With the question of bias thus in 'equipoise' (meaning equally balanced), the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, thereby requiring a new trial on sanity.
Dissenting - Baxter, J.
No, Juror Boje's misconduct did not create a substantial likelihood of actual bias, and the presumption of prejudice was rebutted, so the judgment affirming the sanity verdict should stand. Justice Baxter dissented, arguing the majority's demand for perfection was unrealistic, especially given Nesler's choice of a local trial in a small community where gossip was expected. He viewed Boje's receipt of information as 'passive' and 'inadvertent,' merely overhearing a stranger, rather than actively seeking it. He also considered Boje's failure to report the information to the court as a 'passive' error. Even though she brought up the outside information during jury talks, and made a derogatory post-verdict comment about Nesler, Justice Baxter believed it did not conclusively prove her own actual bias; she might have been expressing frustration or trying to sway others without personally being influenced. He also argued that the outside information about Nesler's drug use was largely cumulative to trial evidence, and the comments about her being a 'bad mother' were 'remote' to the sanity issue. He concluded that, given all the evidence in the trial, it wasn't likely Juror Boje was truly unfair, and thus the presumption of prejudice was successfully rebutted.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standard for rebutting the presumption of prejudice arising from juror misconduct in California. It establishes that a juror's active and intentional use of extraneous information during deliberations to influence other jurors, especially on key issues of the case, strongly indicates actual bias. This goes beyond merely receiving information and sets a high bar for the prosecution to demonstrate that a juror was capable of rendering a verdict based solely on the evidence. The ruling underscores the critical importance of an impartial jury and the strict adherence to deciding cases based only on presented evidence, thereby ensuring robust due process protections and fair trials.
