People v. Nelson
2013 IL App (3d) 120191 (2014)
Rule of Law:
A person cannot be held criminally liable for actions that are involuntary bodily movements caused by a medical condition, such as complex tics from Tourette's syndrome, and a failure to take medication to control such tics does not constitute a voluntary act sufficient for criminal liability in the absence of a legal duty to take the medication.
Facts:
- Robert Nelson suffered from Tourette’s syndrome with obsessive compulsive tendencies for 30 years and experienced both simple and complex motor and verbal tics.
- On March 27, 2010, Nelson made a phone call to Lois Miller, an 84-year-old woman whose name and number he picked at random, and made an explicit comment.
- On April 11, 2010, Nelson called Miller again, identifying himself as 'Ted Long from Victoria’s Secret' and asking for her underwear sizes.
- Miller contacted the police department and her phone provider to set up a 'trap and trace' to identify the caller.
- On April 26, 2010, Nelson called Miller twice, asking her for a date and revealing his name as Rob.
- Nelson was diagnosed with Tourette’s disorder with obsessive compulsive symptoms and had been prescribed medications (Luvox, Risperdal, and Haldol) for his disorders by his psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Fields.
- Nelson testified that he made the phone calls but could not control his behavior due to his tics and premonitory urges, despite knowing the statements would scare or offend an elderly woman.
- At the time he made the calls to Miller, Nelson was not taking his medication, reportedly because he ran out and was unable to obtain more.
Procedural Posture:
- On April 29, 2010, Officer Hopes arrested Robert Nelson after Lois Miller identified his voice and the traced phone number belonged to him.
- On April 30, 2010, the State charged Nelson with four counts of telephone harassment in the Circuit Court of Whiteside County (trial court).
- Nelson waived a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial on December 29, 2010.
- The trial court found Nelson guilty of telephone harassment.
- At sentencing, the trial court entered judgment on three counts of telephone harassment and sentenced Nelson to three concurrent terms of six years in the Department of Corrections.
- Nelson filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- Nelson filed a timely notice of appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of making harassing phone calls, which is an involuntary complex tic due to Tourette's syndrome, constitute a voluntary act sufficient for criminal liability, and does the defendant's failure to take medication to control such tics constitute a voluntary act when there is no legal duty to take it?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McDade
No, Robert Nelson’s actions of making phone calls to Lois Miller did not constitute voluntary acts sufficient for criminal liability, nor did his failure to take medication constitute a voluntary act in the absence of a legal duty. The court reiterated that a material element of every criminal offense is a voluntary act, and a person is not criminally responsible for an involuntary act, particularly those committed during a state of automatism where bodily movements are not controlled by the conscious mind. Citing People v. Grant and the Model Penal Code, the court emphasized that involuntary acts lack the volition to control or prevent the conduct. The uncontroverted expert testimony of Dr. Fields established that Nelson’s phone calls, including selecting the number, dialing it, and uttering offensive statements, were involuntary complex tics (coprolalia) stemming from his Tourette’s syndrome, which he could not control without medication. The trial court properly accepted this expert testimony, as it concerned medical issues beyond a layperson's understanding. Regarding Nelson’s failure to take his medication, the court determined this constituted an omission, or 'nonaction,' rather than an affirmative act. An omission satisfies the voluntary act requirement only if it involves a failure to perform a duty imposed by law. Since the State presented no evidence or legal authority that Nelson had a legal duty to take his medication, his omission could not be considered a voluntary act sufficient for criminal liability. Consequently, the State failed to prove a material element of the crime, necessitating the reversal of Nelson's conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the fundamental principle that criminal liability requires a voluntary act, thereby distinguishing between actions stemming from conscious volition and those resulting from involuntary bodily movements due to medical conditions. It highlights the critical role of uncontroverted expert testimony in establishing automatism defenses, particularly for conditions like Tourette's syndrome that manifest in complex, uncontrollable actions. Furthermore, the ruling clarifies that a failure to take medication, if not a violation of a legal duty, is considered an omission rather than an affirmative voluntary act, setting a high bar for linking such omissions to criminal liability. This precedent will likely impact future cases involving defendants with neurological or psychiatric conditions affecting impulse control, underscoring the necessity for robust medical evidence and careful judicial consideration of the voluntary act element.
