People v. Anonymous
105 AD2d 494 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence that a defendant shares a common blood type with an assailant is admissible because it has probative value on the issue of identity, and any potential for prejudice can be mitigated by jury instructions or a judicial determination that the prejudice outweighs the probative value.
Facts:
- A woman was arrested on a minor charge and held in a detention cell at a Schenectady police station.
- The defendant, Officer Mountain, who worked as a telephone operator at the station, approached the woman's cell on several occasions, offering to help with her release and giving her a note with a phone number.
- On the second day of her detention, Mountain unlocked the woman's cell, entered, and threatened her.
- Mountain then forcibly raped the woman and compelled her to perform oral sodomy.
- Immediately after the assault, the woman spit the assailant's sperm into a paper cup from her lunch tray.
- She later reported the rape to a matron, and upon her release, went to a hospital.
- A hospital examination confirmed the presence of sperm in her vagina, and a laboratory examination of the sperm in the cup revealed it was from a person with type A blood.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Mountain, was indicted for rape, sodomy, and official misconduct.
- At a jury trial in the county court (trial court of first instance), the defendant was found guilty of rape, sodomy, and two counts of official misconduct.
- The defendant appealed the conviction to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals (New York's highest court) granted the defendant leave to appeal to that court.
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Issue:
Is evidence that an assailant had a common blood type, which is shared by a large segment of the population, admissible to help establish the defendant's identity?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Wachtler
Yes. Evidence that an assailant had a common blood type is admissible because it has probative value and does not become inadmissible simply because the characteristic is shared by a large portion of the population. The court explicitly overturned its prior ruling in People v. Robinson, which held that such evidence lacked probative value. The court reasoned that other common characteristics, such as race or sex, are routinely admitted as circumstantial evidence of identity. The Robinson rule was an outlier, universally rejected in other jurisdictions. The court concluded that any fear of the jury giving such scientific evidence undue weight could be managed through proper jury instructions, explaining that it is only circumstantial evidence and noting the percentage of the population with that blood type.
Dissenting - Judge Meyer
The dissent agrees with the majority's new rule regarding the admissibility of common blood type evidence. However, it dissents from the judgment, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error on other evidentiary rulings that were not harmless. Specifically, the dissent contends that the trial court improperly excluded the defendant's holster from evidence, which was critical for impeaching the victim's credibility regarding her description of the weapon worn during the assault. The dissent argues that this error, combined with the improper admission of hearsay testimony from the victim's lawyer, warranted a new trial because the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in New York's evidentiary rules by overturning the per se exclusionary rule established in People v. Robinson. It aligns New York with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions on the admissibility of common blood type evidence. The ruling replaces a rigid prohibition with a flexible balancing test, entrusting trial judges to weigh the probative value of such evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. This change allows prosecutors to introduce another piece of circumstantial evidence to build a case, while emphasizing the role of judicial discretion and jury instructions in preventing jurors from overvaluing scientific data.
