People v. Miller
661 N.E.2d 1358, 638 N.Y.S.2d 577, 87 N.Y.2d 211 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime because the strict liability element of causing serious physical injury to a nonparticipant constitutes an aggravating circumstance that elevates the degree of the crime, rather than a proscribed result of the underlying attempt to forcibly take property.
Facts:
- Defendant was part of a group of about 15 teenagers who approached Charles Grimes, who was known in the area for shoplifting and selling clothing.
- While Grimes was inside a grocery store, defendant and five other teenagers from the group congregated nearby, and one of them displayed a gun to his companions.
- Approximately 45 minutes to an hour later, this group of six returned to the vicinity of the grocery store, and defendant declared he was going to snatch Grimes’s bag.
- Two of the teenagers left, stating they wanted no part of 'it.'
- When Grimes subsequently exited the store, the four remaining teenagers pounced on him, and defendant attempted to grab the bag.
- Grimes struggled free, pushed defendant against a wall, hit him with a can, retrieved his bag, and announced that nothing was going to be taken from him.
- A shot then rang out, and Grimes, holding his bag, bolted with the four teenagers in pursuit.
- Grimes ultimately collapsed and died from a single gunshot wound to his neck, and the bag of clothing was no longer in sight.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was indicted and charged with two counts of murder in the second degree and two counts of robbery in the first degree.
- At trial, defendant requested that the court charge attempted robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the third degree as lesser included offenses of robbery in the first degree.
- The trial court granted defendant’s request.
- The jury convicted defendant of attempted robbery in the first degree under count three and acquitted him of all remaining counts.
- Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that attempted robbery in the first degree was a legal impossibility.
- The Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court) agreed with defendant, modifying the judgment of conviction to attempted robbery in the third degree, vacating the sentence, and remitting to County Court for resentencing.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) granted the People leave to appeal and defendant leave to cross-appeal.
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Issue:
Does attempted robbery in the first degree constitute a legally cognizable crime, even when one of its elements, causing serious physical injury to a nonparticipant, is a strict liability element?
Opinions:
Majority - Ciparick, J.
Yes, attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime. The court held that the crime is legally possible because the intent required for an attempt relates to the core crime of forcible stealing (the taking of property), not to the resulting serious physical injury. Robbery statutes proscribe the forcible taking of property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner. The 'serious physical injury' element (Penal Law § 160.15 [1]) is considered an 'aggravating factor' or 'attendant circumstance' that imposes strict liability and elevates the degree of the crime, leading to harsher punishment due to the greater consequences of the core act. It is not the proscribed result of the criminal conduct itself, which distinguishes it from People v. Campbell. In Campbell, attempted assault in the second degree was impossible because the strict liability element (causing injury) was the proscribed result, making it illogical to intend an unintended result. Here, strict liability attaches to an aggravating circumstance (the injury) rather than the proscribed result of the attempt (the forcible taking of property), similar to People v. Coleman, where attempted promoting prostitution of a minor was possible despite the victim's age being a strict liability element because it was an aggravating circumstance, not the intended result.
Dissenting - Simons, J.
No, attempted robbery in the first degree is a nonexistent crime, and the Appellate Division correctly reduced the conviction to attempted robbery in the third degree. The dissent argued that the reasoning from People v. Campbell applies, which held that there can be no attempt to commit a crime that makes the causing of a certain result criminal even though wholly unintended. Robbery in the first degree, under Penal Law § 160.15 (1), involves two results: (1) forcibly stealing property and (2) causing serious injury. While a defendant can intend the first result (stealing), they cannot intend the second (causing an unintended injury). The dissent viewed the majority's distinction between an 'aggravating circumstance' and a 'proscribed result' as without a difference, as causing injury remains a proscribed result of the statute that cannot be intended. Coleman was distinguished by noting that its aggravating circumstance (victim's age) was a strict liability element of which the defendant was mistaken, not an unintended result. The dissent further noted that felony assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [4]) specifically addresses causing serious physical injury during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, providing a proper vehicle for charging such conduct.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the nuanced intersection of attempt liability and strict liability elements in New York criminal law, particularly within multi-degree offenses like robbery. It establishes that an aggravating factor, even if it carries strict liability (such as causing serious physical injury), does not render an attempted crime legally impossible as long as the actor intends the core criminal conduct. The ruling critically differentiates between an unintended 'result' that is the very essence of the crime (making attempt impossible, per Campbell) and an unintended 'circumstance' that merely elevates the degree of an already intended crime. This distinction has significant implications for how prosecutors charge and courts interpret attempt crimes, ensuring that defendants whose intended criminal acts lead to severe, albeit unintended, consequences can still be held accountable for a higher degree of attempt than just the underlying core offense.
