People v. Merriman
177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 332 P.3d 1187, 60 Cal.4th 1 (2014)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever properly joined charges where evidence supporting the noncapital crimes would be cross-admissible in a separate murder trial, and such joinder does not result in gross unfairness violating constitutional rights. Evidence of prior sexual offenses is generally admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 to show propensity if its probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.
Facts:
- In 1989, 16-year-old Katrina Montgomery dated Mitch Sutton, a founder of the Skin Head Dogs (SHD) gang, which Justin Merriman, also 16, belonged to. While Merriman was incarcerated from 1990-1992, he sent Katrina sexually explicit letters, expressing a desire for a relationship despite her indicating she only wanted friendship and wished to reconcile with Sutton.
- After Merriman's release in spring 1992, Katrina visited his home to clarify their relationship. She later emerged with red marks on her neck, stating Merriman had attacked her while his mother witnessed without intervening. On a separate occasion, Katrina stayed overnight at Merriman's house, only to wake to him making unwanted sexual advances, from which she escaped by feigning illness.
- On Thanksgiving weekend 1992, Katrina attended a party at SHD leader Scott Porcho's home, where Merriman was also present. During the party, Merriman repeatedly tried to get 16-year-old Larry Nicassio to 'get' Katrina with a knife, and was seen aggressively wrestling with Katrina on a bed, ignoring her demands to stop. After a confrontation, Merriman was tended to by Katrina, and he silently urged Nicassio to attack her, later telling Ryan Bush, 'I'm gonna get that bitch.'
- Early the next morning, Katrina arrived at Merriman's house and got into bed with him. Merriman then forced her to orally copulate him and have intercourse, ignoring her pleas that he was hurting her and she feared pregnancy. After a second forced oral copulation, Merriman stabbed Katrina in the throat, struck her head with a wrench, and slit her throat, then rolled her body in blankets.
- Merriman immediately coerced Nicassio and Bush, under threat, to help him dispose of Katrina's body and evidence, leading them to hide the body in a drainage pipe in a rural area and later bury it, while also wiping down and abandoning Katrina's truck to destroy fingerprints.
Procedural Posture:
- In January 1999, a Ventura County Grand Jury returned a 25-count indictment against Justin Merriman, including special circumstance murder of Katrina Montgomery, sexual assaults of Robyn G. and Billie B., charges related to evading arrest in January 1998, and drug offenses.
- In May 1999, a second, five-count indictment was issued, charging Merriman with witness dissuasion crimes related to his attempts to silence grand jury witnesses.
- In 2000, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to consolidate the two indictments.
- Also in 2000, the trial court partially granted a defense motion to sever trial on some charges (drug- and firearm-possession counts, and some drug influence counts unrelated to arrest) but denied the request to sever the murder count from all other charges, finding cross-admissibility.
- Pretrial, the trial court ruled that evidence underlying the seven sexual offense charges was cross-admissible as to the special circumstance allegations associated with the murder count, under Evidence Code sections 1101(b) and 1108.
- In 2001, a jury convicted Merriman of first-degree murder, found true special circumstances for rape and oral copulation, and personal use of a deadly weapon. The jury also convicted him of numerous noncapital crimes.
- After a penalty phase trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.
- Merriman moved for a new trial and for modification of his sentence to life without the possibility of parole.
- The trial court denied both motions and sentenced him to death.
- Merriman's appeal to the California Supreme Court was automatic.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and violate Justin Merriman's constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process by refusing to sever the murder charge from other sexual assault, resisting arrest, and witness dissuasion charges, and by admitting certain uncharged misconduct evidence, resulting in gross unfairness?
Opinions:
Majority - Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance or ordering consolidation, nor did its evidentiary rulings or other actions result in gross unfairness or violate Justin Merriman's constitutional rights. The Court found that the charges met statutory requirements for joinder because the sexual offenses were of the same class of crimes, and the resisting arrest and witness dissuasion charges were connected to the murder by Merriman's motive to avoid criminal liability. The law favors joinder for efficiency, and cross-admissibility of evidence is normally sufficient to dispel prejudice. Specifically, evidence of sexual assaults against Robyn G. and Billie B. was cross-admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 to show Merriman's propensity to commit the rape and forcible oral copulation underlying the murder charge and special circumstances. The Court found substantial probative value due to similarities in victims (SHD 'groupies'), circumstances (forced sexual acts, preventing escape, ignoring pleas), and proximity in time, concluding the risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value. Evidence of Merriman's flight from police and standoff was cross-admissible to show consciousness of guilt for the murder, as was evidence of his attempts to silence grand jury witnesses. The Court found no 'gross unfairness' amounting to a due process violation, noting that the trial court carefully weighed prejudice and that the sexual offense evidence involved charged crimes, reducing the risk of conviction for punishment. The evidence for all crimes was strong and direct, and jurors were instructed to decide each count separately. Potentially inflammatory elements, such as gang membership or vulgar writings, were either relevant to the code of silence or not so inflammatory as to overshadow the horrific murder facts, especially when their explicit text was not read to the jury. Evidentiary rulings regarding uncharged misconduct (Kristen S. sexual assault and tattoo parlor incident, Corie G. sexual assault, Susan V. assault, stolen car possession, and Merriman's mother's credibility) were upheld as relevant for showing propensity, context, consciousness of guilt, or witness credibility, and not unduly prejudicial. Katrina's out-of-court statements to Shawna Torres were properly admitted as spontaneous statements. While the admission of Katrina's statements to her mother was assumed to be erroneous, it was deemed harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Her statements to Lee Jensen were admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing Katrina's state of mind. Regarding alleged juror misconduct by Juror No. 1, her failure to disclose a distant relationship with a Deputy Baker was found to be an inadvertent omission, not deliberate concealment of bias. Although her conversation with Deputy Baker about the case was serious misconduct, the presumption of prejudice was rebutted. The conversation was brief, not initiated by the juror to discuss the case, and not shared with other jurors. The trial court's finding that Juror No. 1 remained open-minded during deliberations was supported by substantial evidence, despite an initial impression of strong evidence, and the speed of deliberations suggested other jurors also found the guilt evidence overwhelming.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in California regarding joinder of charges and the admission of propensity evidence in sexual offense cases under Evidence Code section 1108. It clarifies that cross-admissibility of evidence, particularly concerning consciousness of guilt or propensity, is a primary factor in upholding joinder. The ruling also emphasizes the high bar for proving 'gross unfairness' amounting to a constitutional due process violation from consolidated trials, even with potentially inflammatory character evidence, so long as it serves a relevant legal purpose and the jury is properly instructed. Furthermore, it reiterates the deference given to trial court findings on juror bias, especially when conflicting testimony exists, making it difficult to overturn such findings on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record.
