People v. McNeese

Supreme Court of Colorado
892 P.2d 304 (1995)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

For immunity under Colorado's "make-my-day" statute (§ 18-1-704.5), the occupant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the intruder made an actual "unlawful entry," which requires a knowing violation of the criminal law, such as burglary or criminal trespass, not merely an entry that violates a private agreement.

Facts:

Vivian Daniels entered into an oral lease to rent a couch in Robert Earl McNeese's apartment.
A specific condition of the lease was that Vivian's common-law husband, John Daniels, was never to enter the apartment under any circumstances, as McNeese was aware of his reputation for violence.
On November 15, 1991, after McNeese made sexual advances toward Vivian, she decided to move out and left the apartment late at night.
Vivian went to John Daniels' apartment and told him what had occurred.
At approximately 2:30 a.m., John Daniels, Vivian Daniels, and David Wessels, all of whom had been drinking heavily, went to McNeese's apartment to retrieve Vivian's belongings.
Vivian Daniels used her key to let John Daniels and Wessels into the apartment while McNeese was asleep in his bedroom.
An altercation occurred in which John Daniels put McNeese in a chokehold and threatened him.
Shortly thereafter, McNeese stabbed and killed John Daniels and David Wessels, and also stabbed Vivian Daniels.

Procedural Posture:

Robert Earl McNeese was charged in county court with first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and first-degree assault.
Following a preliminary hearing, the county court bound McNeese over for trial on charges including two counts of second-degree murder.
In the district court, McNeese filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charges, claiming immunity under the "make-my-day" statute, § 18-1-704.5.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss the second-degree murder charge for the death of John Daniels, but denied it for the other charges.
The People (the prosecution) appealed the dismissal of the John Daniels murder charge to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal.
The People petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals decision, which was granted.

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Issue:

Does a person's entry into a dwelling, made with the express permission and key of a lawful tenant but in violation of a condition in that tenant's oral lease with the primary occupant, constitute an "unlawful entry" under Colorado's "make-my-day" statute, thereby granting the primary occupant immunity from prosecution for using deadly force against that person?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Erickson

No. John Daniels's entry into the dwelling did not constitute an "unlawful entry" under the statute because the term requires a knowing, criminal entry, not merely the violation of a private agreement. The plain language and legislative history of the "make-my-day" statute indicate it was intended to protect occupants from criminal intruders like burglars, not to immunize killings arising from entries that are merely uninvited or in breach of a civil lease agreement. The statute requires an actual unlawful entry, not simply the occupant's reasonable belief that the entry was unlawful. To satisfy this objective threshold, the defendant must prove the intruder knowingly violated a criminal statute such as burglary or criminal trespass. Without this requirement of a culpable mental state for the entry itself, the statute could be used to justify violence in otherwise benign situations. Furthermore, the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a reasonable belief John Daniels intended to commit a crime in addition to the entry.

Dissenting - Justice Scott

Yes. John Daniels's entry was unlawful, and the majority improperly narrows the scope of the "make-my-day" statute by inventing a "knowing" criminal entry requirement that does not exist in the statute's plain text. The legislative intent was to give homeowners the benefit of the doubt and protect their constitutional right to self-defense, not to force them to analyze an intruder's mental state. The term "unlawful entry" is broad enough to include any criminal trespass, which occurred here when Daniels entered with the intent to assault McNeese, thereby exceeding any permission granted by Vivian. The trial court's factual finding that Daniels assaulted McNeese was supported by the record and should be upheld, satisfying the statute's additional requirements. The majority's decision usurps legislative authority and undermines the right of citizens to feel safe in their homes.

Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Chief Justice Rovira

No. While I agree with the majority's result to remand the case, I disagree with its definition of "unlawful entry." The majority is incorrect to require a "knowing" criminal entry, as this improperly shifts the focus from the objective fact of the intruder's act to the intruder's subjective mental state, which an occupant cannot be expected to know. A sounder definition, based on the criminal code, would be that an "unlawful entry" is any entry that violates a criminal law, regardless of the intruder's specific mental state. This would include offenses like third-degree criminal trespass, which the majority's definition would illogically exclude. The statute's focus is on the reasonable belief of the occupant, not the culpable mental state of the intruder.

Analysis:

This decision significantly narrows the application of Colorado's "make-my-day" statute by defining "unlawful entry" not as a common-sense term but as a specific legal standard requiring a knowing violation of criminal law. It establishes a high, objective threshold for defendants seeking immunity, shifting the inquiry from the occupant's subjective fear to the intruder's provable criminal intent at the moment of entry. This precedent makes it much more difficult for a defendant to secure a pretrial dismissal under the statute, particularly in cases involving acquaintances, co-tenants, or domestic disputes where the nature of the entry is ambiguous. The ruling distinguishes civil wrongs, like violating a lease, from the criminal acts necessary to trigger the statute's powerful immunity protections.

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