People v. McGee
31 Cal. 2d 229, 187 P.2d 706, 1947 Cal. LEXIS 236 (1947)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant who inflicts a dangerous or life-threatening wound on a victim is criminally liable for the victim's death, even if grossly negligent medical treatment contributes to the death, so long as the original wound remains a contributing cause of death.
Facts:
- On July 16, 1945, defendant Henry McGee and the deceased, Arthur Rypdahl, were at a fraternal club.
- During a poker game, Rypdahl became hostile towards McGee, verbally insulted him, shoved him against a pool table, and threatened that McGee would be 'carried out feet first.'
- McGee and a companion left the club, but returned moments later when the companion realized he might have left money behind.
- Upon their return, Rypdahl again confronted McGee as he was trying to leave, repeating the 'feet first' threat and adding, 'I ought to cut your God damned throat.'
- As Rypdahl advanced on him, McGee, stating he was scared, fired a pistol through his coat pocket, wounding Rypdahl in the abdomen.
- Rypdahl was transported to a hospital for treatment of the gunshot wound.
- Surgeons at the hospital did not operate to control Rypdahl's internal bleeding for more than 10 hours after his admission.
- Rypdahl died the following day as a result of hemorrhage from the bullet wound.
Procedural Posture:
- Henry McGee was bound over by a committing magistrate on a charge of manslaughter.
- The district attorney filed an information in the superior court (trial court) charging McGee with murder.
- The trial court denied McGee's motions to set aside the murder charge.
- Following a trial, a jury found McGee guilty of manslaughter.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and denied McGee's motion for a new trial.
- McGee appealed the judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for a new trial to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's criminal liability for homicide extend to a death that occurs after the defendant inflicted a dangerous wound, even if grossly negligent medical treatment was a contributing factor to the death?
Opinions:
Majority - Schauer, J.
Yes. A defendant's criminal liability for homicide extends to a death that occurs after the defendant inflicted a dangerous wound, even if grossly negligent medical treatment was a contributing factor. The court reasoned that the defendant set in motion the events that culminated in the victim's death. When the direct result of the wound is a hemorrhage that would be sufficient to cause death if not promptly controlled, a subsequent delay in surgical treatment, even if grossly negligent, is not a legally sufficient 'supervening cause' that breaks the chain of causation. The delay in treatment is not an intervening force; rather, it is a failure of a force to intervene to save the victim. The defendant cannot be relieved of liability because no force intervened to save the victim from the natural consequences of the defendant's criminal act.
Dissenting - Carter, J.
No. The conviction should not be affirmed because the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. The majority opinion acknowledges a 'plethora of error,' including manifestly erroneous jury instructions, improper admission of evidence, and improper exclusion of evidence regarding the medical treatment. The dissenting justice argued that the majority erred by analyzing each error in isolation for prejudice. The cumulative effect of these numerous and significant errors was so substantial that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice, regardless of whether any single error, viewed alone, would warrant reversal.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the availability of the supervening cause defense in homicide cases involving medical malpractice. It establishes a strong presumption of continuous causation, holding that as long as the defendant's initial wound is a contributing factor, even gross medical negligence will not break the causal chain. This ruling makes it exceptionally difficult for defendants to shift legal blame to medical providers, unless it can be proven that the medical treatment was the sole cause of death and the original injury was no longer an operative factor. The case reinforces the principle that a defendant takes their victim as they find them, including the potential for negligent medical care.
