People v. McDonald
208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 37 Cal. 3d 351 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
When an eyewitness identification is the key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by other independent evidence, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could affect the identification's accuracy and are not likely to be fully understood by the jury.
Facts:
- On August 20, 1979, Jose Esparza was shot and killed by a Black man during an apparent robbery at a busy intersection in Long Beach.
- The prosecution's case against Eddie Bobby McDonald rested on the testimony of seven eyewitnesses who identified him as the perpetrator with varying degrees of certainty.
- Many of the identifying witnesses had obstructed views, were under stress, and had previously expressed uncertainty or failed to identify McDonald in pretrial photographic lineups.
- One prosecution eyewitness, Helen Waller, who is Black, testified definitively that McDonald was not the perpetrator, stating the gunman had a much darker skin complexion.
- Two prosecution witnesses claimed the gunman wore a large, gold earring, which five defense witnesses testified McDonald had never worn.
- The defense presented six alibi witnesses, including McDonald's fiancée, aunt, and grandfather, who testified that McDonald was in Saraland, Alabama on the day of the crime.
- This alibi was supported by physical evidence, including postcards postmarked from Arizona shortly after McDonald allegedly left for Alabama and telephone bills showing calls from Alabama to California.
- Multiple defense witnesses testified McDonald was bald during this period, whereas prosecution witnesses described the gunman as having a moderate Afro hairstyle.
Procedural Posture:
- Eddie Bobby McDonald was charged in a California trial court with one count of murder with a special circumstance of robbery and a separate count of robbery.
- Before trial, McDonald's defense counsel filed a motion to admit the expert testimony of psychologist Dr. Robert Shomer on the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification.
- The trial court denied the motion, ruling the expert testimony inadmissible because it would invade the province of the jury.
- Following trial, the jury convicted McDonald of murder and found the robbery special circumstance to be true.
- However, the same jury acquitted McDonald of the substantive robbery charge in the second count.
- The jury subsequently fixed the penalty at death.
- The case came before the Supreme Court of California on an automatic appeal.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by excluding a qualified expert's testimony on psychological factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identification when the prosecution's case relies almost exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony?
Opinions:
Majority - Mosk, J.
Yes, the trial court abused its discretion. When eyewitness identification is the central and uncorroborated evidence in a criminal case, it is ordinarily error to exclude expert testimony on psychological factors affecting its accuracy that are beyond the jury's common experience. The court reasoned that the reliability of eyewitness identification is a complex subject, and scientific research has revealed numerous counter-intuitive principles, such as the weak correlation between a witness's confidence and their accuracy, the significant impairment of cross-racial identification, and the distorting effect of stress. The court found that the proposed testimony from Dr. Shomer would not invade the province of the jury, as it would provide general principles to help jurors evaluate the evidence, not opine on any specific witness's credibility. Furthermore, the Kelly-Frye rule for novel scientific methods does not apply to this type of expert testimony, which explains psychological phenomena rather than presenting evidence from a machine or new process. Given that the prosecution's case was based solely on eyewitness accounts that were contradicted by other eyewitness testimony and a strong alibi defense, the exclusion of this critical expert testimony was prejudicial error requiring reversal.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly changed California evidence law by recognizing the potential unreliability of eyewitness testimony and creating a pathway for its challenge through expert testimony. It moved away from the prior standard that almost universally excluded such evidence, establishing that in cases heavily dependent on uncorroborated eyewitnesses, expert testimony can be crucial for a fair trial. The case armed defense attorneys with a vital tool to educate juries on scientifically-validated factors affecting memory and perception that are often contrary to common-sense assumptions. This holding has had a profound impact on how eyewitness evidence is treated in criminal proceedings, encouraging greater scrutiny of what was once considered highly reliable evidence.
