People v. Marsh
58 Cal. 2d 732, 26 Cal. Rptr. 300, 376 P.2d 300 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
Out-of-court statements offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to show the defendant's state of mind (such as a good faith belief), are not hearsay and are admissible to negate the specific intent element of a crime.
Facts:
- Defendants Marsh, Crane, and Bateson were not licensed to practice medicine.
- They promoted and distributed electric machines, falsely representing that the machines could cure a wide variety of ailments.
- They obtained money from sick and neurotic individuals based on these false representations.
- The payments, ranging from $175 to $2,000, were characterized as "donations" for the "loan" of the machines in an attempt to avoid charges of illegal sales.
- One machine, for which a $175 "donation" was received, was identical in design to a common radio repair device that retailed for $49.95.
- The defendants claimed that even if their representations were false, they held a good faith belief in the machines' curative powers based on reports and conversations they had with various doctors and scientists.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendants Marsh, Crane, and Bateson were charged in a trial court with attempted grand theft, conspiracy to commit grand theft, and conspiracy to practice medicine without a license.
- A jury in the trial court convicted the defendants on all three counts.
- The defendants' motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.
- Defendants Marsh and Crane (appellants) appealed from the judgment of conviction and the order denying a new trial to the California Supreme Court (this court).
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by excluding, as hearsay, out-of-court statements offered by a defendant to prove their good faith belief in representations they made, when that belief is a defense to a specific intent crime like theft by false pretenses?
Opinions:
Majority - Peters, J.
Yes. A trial court commits reversible error by excluding evidence of out-of-court statements that are offered to prove a defendant's good faith belief, as this evidence is not hearsay when used to show the defendant's state of mind. The crime of theft by false pretenses requires a specific intent to defraud, meaning the defendant must know the representation is false or make it recklessly. A defendant's actual and reasonable belief in the truth of the representations is a complete defense. Here, the defendants offered letters, reports, and conversations not to prove that their machines actually worked, but to show the basis for their belief that they did. This evidence directly addresses their mental state, is not hearsay, and its exclusion was prejudicial because it deprived them of their primary defense to the theft charges. However, this error does not affect the conviction for conspiracy to practice medicine without a license, as a good faith belief in the efficacy of a treatment is not a defense to that charge. While the trial court also erred in instructing the jury on the general intent for this conspiracy charge (conspiracy is always a specific intent crime requiring intent to violate the law), the error was not prejudicial because the evidence overwhelmingly showed the defendants knew their conduct was illegal.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Schauer, J., and McComb, J.
No. The judgment should be affirmed in its entirety.
Analysis:
This case solidifies a crucial exception to the hearsay rule, clarifying that out-of-court statements are admissible when offered to prove their effect on the listener's state of mind, rather than for their truth. It establishes that for specific intent crimes, where the defendant's mental state is a key element, excluding evidence that supports a defense of good faith belief constitutes prejudicial error. The decision also reinforces the principle that conspiracy is always a specific intent crime, requiring the prosecution to prove the defendants intended to agree to violate a law they knew existed, even if the underlying substantive crime is a general intent or public welfare offense.
