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People v. Marrero

NY: Court of …
69 NY 2d 382, 507 NE 2d 1068 (1987)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A defendant's personal misinterpretation of a statute does not constitute a valid mistake of law defense under New York Penal Law § 15.20(2)(a); the defense is available only when a defendant relies on a statute or other official statement that is later determined to be invalid or erroneous.


Facts:

  • Marrero was a Federal corrections officer working at a federal prison.
  • He was arrested in a New York club for carrying a loaded handgun for which he did not have a license.
  • Marrero believed he was legally exempt from the state's firearm licensing requirement.
  • His belief stemmed from his interpretation of Penal Law § 265.20, which exempted 'peace officers,' and CPL 2.10(25), which defined a peace officer as a corrections officer of 'any penal correctional institution.'
  • Marrero interpreted the word 'any' to include federal correctional institutions, thus making him, in his view, an exempt 'peace officer.'

Procedural Posture:

  • Marrero was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
  • The trial court granted Marrero's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, finding his interpretation of the peace officer exemption statute was correct.
  • The People (the prosecution) appealed to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
  • The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order in a 3-2 decision and reinstated the indictment.
  • The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the trial judge refused to allow Marrero to present a mistake of law defense.
  • Marrero was convicted.
  • Marrero appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction.
  • Marrero was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.

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Issue:

Does New York Penal Law § 15.20(2)(a) permit a mistake of law defense when a defendant's mistaken belief about the legality of their conduct is based on their personal, albeit reasonable, misinterpretation of a valid statute?


Opinions:

Majority - Bellacosa, J.

No. A defendant's personal misreading of a statute does not give rise to a mistake of law defense under Penal Law § 15.20(2)(a). This statutory defense is a very narrow exception to the fundamental principle that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. It applies only when a defendant relies on an official statement of law that is later invalidated, not when a defendant misinterprets a valid statute. To allow a defense based on personal misunderstanding would encourage ignorance of the law, undermine its enforcement, and allow the exception to swallow the rule, as countless defendants could contrive defenses based on their purported misinterpretations. The legislative intent was to codify the defense for situations where the law itself was mistaken, not where the individual was mistaken about the law.


Dissenting - Hancock, Jr., J.

Yes. The plain language of Penal Law § 15.20(2)(a) permits a mistake of law defense when a defendant's good-faith 'mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in... a statute.' The majority’s interpretation creates an illogical anomaly where the defense is only available to a defendant who was not actually mistaken about the law at the time of the act (i.e., they correctly read a statute that was later invalidated). The New York Legislature deliberately rejected the more restrictive language of the Model Penal Code, which limits the defense to reliance on a statute later found to be 'invalid or erroneous.' Punishing an individual who acted in good-faith based on a reasonable reading of a statute, particularly for a 'malum prohibitum' offense (wrong only because it is prohibited), is unjust and contrary to the legislative goal of reforming the harsh common-law rule.



Analysis:

This decision significantly narrows the scope of the statutory mistake of law defense in New York, effectively aligning its interpretation with the more restrictive Model Penal Code approach despite key differences in the statutes' text. The court establishes a bright-line rule that a defendant's subjective belief about a law's meaning is irrelevant; the defense only applies if the law itself was defective. This prioritizes the strong public policy of ensuring legal compliance and preventing a flood of potentially fraudulent defenses over the individual's interest in being judged on their subjective moral blameworthiness. Future defendants in New York cannot excuse their conduct by claiming they reasonably, but incorrectly, interpreted a valid statute.

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