People v. Maffett
464 Mich. 878, 633 N.W.2d 339 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The creation and enforcement of a common-law entrapment defense by the judiciary is an unconstitutional usurpation of the powers of the legislative and executive branches. Any such defense must be created by the Legislature to be valid.
Facts:
- Todd Lamar Maffett possessed between 50 and 225 grams of cocaine.
- Maffett had the intent to deliver this cocaine to another person.
- Maffett alleged that he was entrapped into committing this offense through the inducement of government agents.
Procedural Posture:
- In the Eaton Circuit Court (trial court), Todd Lamar Maffett moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground of entrapment.
- Following an entrapment hearing, the trial court denied Maffett's motion to dismiss.
- Maffett (appellant) applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court), which the court denied.
- Maffett (appellant) then applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court (highest court), which was initially granted.
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Issue:
Does the judicial branch have the authority to create and enforce a common-law entrapment defense, or does doing so violate the separation of powers doctrine?
Opinions:
Per curiam - Per Curiam
The court did not address the merits of the issue. The majority vacated its prior order granting leave to appeal and denied the application for leave, stating it was no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the Court.
Dissenting - Corrigan, C.J.
No, the judicial branch does not have the authority to create an entrapment defense, as doing so violates the separation of powers doctrine. The judicially-crafted entrapment defense is a usurpation of legislative power to define crimes and executive power to enforce laws. The dissent argues that the historical justifications for the defense—implied legislative intent and inherent judicial supervisory power—are legally unsound. The 'implied intent' theory is a form of judicial legislation, as courts should apply statutes as written, not based on a perceived 'spirit' of the law. The 'inherent authority' rationale violates the separation of powers (Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2) by allowing courts to regulate police conduct, which is a legislative function, and to bar prosecutions, which is an executive function. Because the defense is a substantive rule of law, not a procedural one, its creation falls outside the judiciary's constitutional authority. Therefore, the common-law entrapment defense should be abrogated, leaving it to the Legislature to enact a statutory defense if it deems one necessary.
Analysis:
This dissenting opinion presents a forceful argument for judicial restraint and strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine. It challenges the entire legal foundation of the judicially-created entrapment defense, which has been a part of American jurisprudence for nearly a century. If this view were adopted, it would represent a monumental shift in criminal law, stripping courts of the power to dismiss cases based on improper police inducement and placing that authority squarely with the legislature. This would fundamentally alter the relationship between the judiciary and law enforcement, forcing defendants to rely on statutory defenses rather than common-law principles developed by judges.
