People v. Lloyd F.
2025 NY Slip Op 04583 (2025)
Rule of Law:
Under New York's 'Raise the Age' legislation, 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the retention of an adolescent offender's case in the Youth Part of the Supreme Court, rather than transfer to Family Court, requires a high threshold of exceptionality, balancing significant aggravating factors against mitigating considerations, and proof that the adolescent is not amenable to rehabilitation in Family Court.
Facts:
- Lloyd F. was 16 years old when he was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.
- Prior to his arrest, a police officer allegedly observed Lloyd F. in a social media livestream smoking marijuana and pointing a firearm at the camera.
- Lloyd F. had a prior youthful offender adjudication for assault in the first degree, committed when he was 14 years old, for which he served a one-year term of imprisonment.
- During his prior incarceration, Lloyd F. formed a relationship with a pastor who provided mentorship and guidance, helping him become self-aware of family challenges.
- Upon his release from incarceration, Lloyd F. reconnected with the pastor, enrolled in several programs, received transportation to appointments, and was offered employment assistance by a local Councilperson.
- Despite engaging with these services, Lloyd F. was subsequently arrested again for possessing a loaded firearm with 1 round in the chamber and 15 rounds in an attached magazine.
Procedural Posture:
- The People of the State of New York charged Lloyd F. (an adolescent offender, aged 16) in the Youth Part of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.
- The People filed a motion pursuant to CPL 722.23(1) to prevent the removal of the action to the Family Court, Richmond County.
- On May 10, 2021, the Youth Part of the Supreme Court (Alison M. Hamanjian, J.) granted the People's motion, preventing removal of the action to Family Court.
- Lloyd F. filed an omnibus motion, including a branch to suppress physical evidence.
- On March 21, 2022, after a hearing, the Youth Part of the Supreme Court denied that branch of Lloyd F.'s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
- Thereafter, Lloyd F. entered a plea of guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in full satisfaction of the indictment.
- A judgment of conviction and sentence was rendered on April 29, 2022, in Richmond County.
- Lloyd F. appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, bringing up for review the May 10, 2021 order and the denial of his suppression motion.
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Issue:
Does the mere possession of a loaded firearm by a 16-year-old, coupled with a prior youthful offender adjudication for assault and subsequent re-arrest after engaging in rehabilitative services, constitute 'extraordinary circumstances' sufficient to prevent the transfer of the case from the Youth Part of the Supreme Court to Family Court under CPL 722.23(1)(d)?
Opinions:
Majority - Chambers, J.
No, the facts presented do not constitute 'extraordinary circumstances' warranting retention of the case in the Youth Part rather than transfer to Family Court. The court emphasizes that the 'Raise the Age' legislation was enacted to create a presumption of removal to Family Court for adolescent offenders, with 'extraordinary circumstances' meant to apply only in the most exceptional cases, reflecting a legislative intent for rehabilitation over punitive measures for youth. The court interpreted 'extraordinary circumstances' by looking at its common dictionary meaning ('beyond what is usual, regular, or customary' or 'exceptional to a very marked extent') and the legislative history of the 'Raise the Age' legislation. This history, including reports by the Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and Justice and Assembly floor debates, underscored the policy goals of modernizing New York law based on scientific research regarding adolescent brain development, reducing disproportionate impact on youth of color, mitigating lifelong consequences of youthful mistakes, and expanding access to supportive services. The court noted that legislators intended for only 'extremely rare and exceptional cases' involving 'highly unusual and heinous facts' to remain in criminal court. Applying this framework, the court found that Lloyd F.'s weapon possession charges, standing alone, do not meet the extraordinary circumstances standard because the Legislature did not make weapon possession categorically ineligible for removal, only those where a weapon was displayed in furtherance of an offense (which was not alleged here). The additional evidence, including the social media livestream (which did not allege unlawful conduct beyond possession), was dismissed as mere 'adolescent bravado' consistent with youthful impulsivity rather than exceptional cruelty or heinousness. Furthermore, Lloyd F.'s prior youthful offender adjudication and subsequent re-arrest after engaging in services did not establish a 'pattern of recidivism or escalating conduct' or 'strong proof' that he would not benefit from Family Court services. The court specifically rejected the Youth Part's reasoning that a single re-arrest, post-rehabilitation efforts, was dispositive of future potential, stating it would undermine the core purpose of the 'Raise the Age' legislation.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the high threshold required for 'extraordinary circumstances' under CPL 722.23(1)(d) of New York's 'Raise the Age' legislation. It reinforces the legislative intent to prioritize rehabilitation in Family Court for most adolescent offenders, even those charged with serious offenses like weapon possession, unless truly exceptional aggravating factors exist. The decision establishes that a single re-arrest following engagement in rehabilitative services is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that an adolescent is beyond the reach of the Family Court system, thus preventing a potentially overly punitive interpretation of the statute. This ruling will likely lead to more adolescent offender cases being transferred to Family Court, emphasizing developmental immaturity and the potential for reform over a strict focus on past offenses, unless those offenses demonstrate a pattern of extreme violence or a leadership role in heinous crimes.
