People v. Lechleitner
804 N.W.2d 345, 291 Mich App 56 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A person operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated continues to 'operate' it, for purposes of causing death, so long as the vehicle remains in a position posing a significant risk of collision, even if the vehicle is no longer in motion, and all individuals placed in danger by the intoxicated operation are considered 'victims' for sentencing guidelines.
Facts:
- On November 22, 2007, defendant drove his truck on a freeway with a blood alcohol content of 0.12 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, exceeding the legal limit.
- Defendant lost control of his truck on a slippery freeway surface, striking both the right and left guardrails.
- The truck came to a stop in the middle of the freeway, occupying two lanes, after which defendant turned off his headlights, activated hazard lights, opened the door, and attempted to propel the truck with his leg.
- A second driver, with a passenger, swerved to avoid defendant's truck and stopped on the shoulder of the freeway out of concern for the accident.
- A third car, also with a driver and a passenger, swerved to avoid defendant's truck and, in doing so, struck the second vehicle that had stopped on the shoulder.
- The driver of the second vehicle was killed as a result of the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was convicted in circuit court of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor and causing death, and sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender.
- Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a person continue to 'operate' a motor vehicle for purposes of MCL 257.625(4) when the vehicle, having been driven by an intoxicated person, is no longer in motion but remains in a position posing a significant risk of collision, and are all individuals endangered by this operation considered victims for sentencing purposes under OV 9?
Opinions:
Majority - Per CURIAM.
Yes, a person continues to 'operate' a motor vehicle under such circumstances, and all endangered individuals are considered victims for sentencing purposes. The court affirmed the trial court's application of the definition of 'operate' as established in People v. Wood, which states that a person continues to operate a vehicle once it has been put in motion or in a position posing a significant risk of collision, until it is returned to a position posing no such risk. The court rejected the defendant's argument for a lay dictionary definition requiring the vehicle to be functioning, emphasizing that the statute does not require the defendant's vehicle to be in motion at the time of the accident, but rather that death be caused by the defendant's operation of the vehicle while intoxicated. Regarding Offense Variable (OV) 9 for sentencing, the court concluded that the defendant's intoxication and the resulting fatal car collision endangered not only the person who died but also the decedent's passenger, the driver of the car that struck the decedent, and that car's passenger, totaling four victims and justifying a score of 10 points.
Concurring - WILDER, EJ.
Yes, the conviction and sentence should be affirmed. Justice Wilder concurred in the result reached by the majority but declined to join the majority's comments concerning the use of dictionaries to interpret a statute, citing Liberty Hill Housing Corp v City of Livonia to suggest a disagreement with the majority's approach to this specific aspect of statutory interpretation.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad interpretation of 'operation' within Michigan's OUIL causing death statutes, holding intoxicated drivers accountable for creating ongoing hazards. It clarifies that legal 'operation' extends beyond active driving to include situations where an impaired driver's actions leave a vehicle in a dangerous position, forming the causal link to subsequent harm. Furthermore, the decision provides guidance on the scoring of OV 9, establishing that all individuals placed in danger during the course of the sentencing offense, not just those directly harmed, count as victims. This dual clarification strengthens the prosecution's ability to hold intoxicated drivers responsible for the full scope of danger and harm resulting from their impaired actions.
