People v. Latsis
1978 Colo. LEXIS 649, 578 P.2d 1055, 195 Colo. 411 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague when it requires proof of 'circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent,' as this phrase establishes a heightened evidentiary standard for the prosecution to prove specific intent, rather than an unclear element of the offense itself.
Facts:
- Petros Demetrios Latsis was alleged to have committed acts that constituted criminal solicitation.
- Latsis was specifically accused of two separate offenses of soliciting another person to commit the felony of aggravated robbery.
Procedural Posture:
- Petros Demetrios Latsis was charged by information with criminal solicitation in the district court.
- Latsis filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the criminal solicitation statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
- The district court (trial court) granted Latsis's motion and dismissed the two solicitation counts.
- The district attorney, representing the People, appealed the district court's ruling directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Colorado's criminal solicitation statute, which requires proof of 'circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent,' violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by being impermissibly vague?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Lee
No. The Colorado criminal solicitation statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The challenged phrase 'under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent' does not define an element of the crime in an unclear way; instead, it imposes a heightened evidentiary burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant's specific intent. The term 'bona fide' is also not vague, as it is a commonly understood term meaning 'in good faith.' The corroboration requirement benefits the defendant by protecting against convictions based on ambiguous statements or statements made in jest. Because the phrase sets a standard for the quantum of evidence required, rather than defining the crime itself, it is a matter for the jury to weigh and does not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Groves
Yes. The statute is unconstitutionally vague. The phrase 'under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent' is not clearly defined, making it impossible for a person of common intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited. A judge cannot provide a meaningful definition of this phrase in jury instructions, leaving the jury to guess at its meaning. This violates the due process principle that criminal enactments must be clearly defined, as it forces judges and juries to determine a critical element of the crime on a case-by-case basis.
Analysis:
This decision distinguishes between statutory language that defines the elements of an offense and language that establishes a standard of proof. By categorizing 'circumstances strongly corroborative of intent' as an evidentiary standard, the court upholds the statute against a vagueness challenge, providing a blueprint for legislatures to build in safeguards for defendants without rendering the statute void. This case solidifies the principle that requiring a higher quantum of proof for a mental state element like intent is a permissible legislative choice. It narrows the scope of vagueness doctrine, suggesting that challenges are less likely to succeed when the allegedly vague language pertains to the strength of evidence rather than the definition of prohibited conduct.
