No. A murder conviction cannot be overturned on the grounds that it was a 'mercy killing' because there is no constitutional right to euthanasia. The court explained that there is a huge difference between letting someone die by refusing medical treatment (which is allowed) and actively killing them with an injection (which is illegal). The judges worried that if they created a right to euthanasia, it would create a 'slippery slope' where vulnerable people might be pressured to end their lives. They decided that if such a major change in the law is to be made, it must be done by elected lawmakers who represent the people, not by judges.

No, the court did not make a mistake. The testimony Dr. Kevorkian wanted from Mr. Youk's relatives was not legally relevant. In Michigan, a person's consent or 'mercy killing' are not acceptable defenses to murder charges. Also, the prosecutor was right to object when Dr. Kevorkian started saying things that sounded like new evidence during his final argument. When someone chooses to defend themselves, they have to follow the same rules as lawyers. They can't use their final argument to sneak in testimony that wasn't given during the trial. So the prosecutor's objections were appropriate and didn't wrongly point out that Dr. Kevorkian chose not to testify.

No, the court did not make a mistake. The testimony that Dr. Kevorkian sought from Mr. Youk's relatives was not legally relevant. In Michigan, a person's consent or 'mercy killing' are not acceptable defenses to murder charges. Furthermore, the prosecutor was correct to object when Dr. Kevorkian began saying things that sounded like new evidence during his final argument. A defendant who chooses to represent themselves must follow the same rules as a lawyer. They can't use their final argument to introduce testimony that wasn't given during the trial. Therefore, the prosecutor's objections were appropriate and did not wrongly point out that Dr. Kevorkian chose not to testify.

No. The Due Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment do not establish a fundamental right to receive active euthanasia. The court distinguished the act of administering a lethal injection (active euthanasia) from the recognized right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment (passive euthanasia) and from physician-assisted suicide, which has been held by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg not to be a fundamental right. The court found no legal precedent for expanding the right to privacy to encompass a right to be killed by another person. The court adopted the 'slippery slope' argument, fearing that recognizing a right to voluntary euthanasia could lead to involuntary euthanasia, and concluded that legalizing such a practice is a complex policy decision that belongs to the legislature and the public, not the judiciary. The court held that it is ill-equipped to make subjective determinations about the quality of human life or what constitutes 'intolerable' suffering.

No, the trial court did not err. The testimony Kevorkian sought to introduce from Terrence and Melody Youk was not relevant to any legally recognized defense to murder. Consent and euthanasia are not valid defenses to murder charges under Michigan law. Furthermore, the prosecutor's objections during Kevorkian's closing argument were appropriate responses to Kevorkian's attempts to introduce facts not in evidence through his statements. A defendant who chooses to represent himself is bound by the same rules of evidence and procedure as attorneys, and cannot use closing arguments to put forth testimony not introduced during the trial. Therefore, the prosecutor's objections were warranted and did not improperly comment on Kevorkian's decision not to testify.

No, the trial court did not err in excluding testimony from Terrence and Melody Youk, and the prosecutor's objections during Kevorkian's closing argument did not improperly reference his decision not to testify. The testimony Kevorkian sought to introduce from Terrence and Melody Youk was not relevant to any legally recognized defense to murder. Consent and euthanasia are not valid defenses to murder charges under Michigan law. Furthermore, the prosecutor's objections during Kevorkian's closing argument were appropriate responses to Kevorkian's attempts to introduce facts not in evidence through his statements. A defendant who chooses to represent himself is bound by the same rules of evidence and procedure as attorneys, and cannot use closing arguments to put forth testimony not introduced during the trial. Therefore, the prosecutor's objections were warranted and did not improperly comment on Kevorkian's decision not to testify.

People v. Kevorkian

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Issue:

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