No, the law against assisted suicide is constitutional because there is no 'right to commit suicide' in the Constitution. The court explained there's a big difference between refusing medical treatment to let nature take its course (which is legal) and actively doing something to make yourself die (which is not a protected right). The court also decided that Dr. Kevorkian's actions weren't murder. Murder is when you directly perform the act that kills someone. Just giving a person the tools to end their own life is a different, less serious crime called 'assisting suicide'.

No, the law is constitutional, and I agree with the main opinion on that. But, I disagree about the murder charge. I think that when you are as involved as Dr. Kevorkian was—setting up machines and giving gas masks—you are actively participating in the death, and that should be considered murder. The law shouldn't be changed to make it a lesser crime.

Yes, a law that completely bans assisted suicide is unconstitutional. I disagree with the other judges on the biggest issue. I believe that people who are terminally ill and in terrible pain have a constitutional right to choose to end their suffering with a doctor's help. It's one of the most personal decisions a person can make, and the government shouldn't be able to take that choice away completely.

The law banning assisted suicide in Michigan was made correctly and doesn't violate the state's rules. Also, the U.S. Constitution doesn't say states have to allow people to help others commit suicide. The law says if you give someone the means to end their life, like medicine or a weapon, it's the same as if you did it yourself. There's a difference between helping someone commit suicide and stopping medical treatment that keeps them alive; stopping treatment just lets nature take its course. In the murder case, an old ruling is overturned - helping someone commit suicide by giving them the means is not automatically murder. It's only murder if you directly caused the death. If you just helped but didn't do the final act, it's 'assisting suicide,' which is a different crime. The lower court needs to look at the case again to decide if there's enough proof for a murder trial.

I agree the assisted suicide law is mostly okay under the state's rules and the U.S. Constitution. But I don't agree with changing the definition of murder to say you're only guilty if you do the final act that causes death. In the case with Dr. Kevorkian, what he did is enough to charge him with murder, so the Court of Appeals made the right choice.

I disagree that there's never a constitutional right to get help from a doctor to end your life. I agree the assisted suicide law was made properly. I also agree with changing the definition of murder and making 'assisting suicide' its own crime. But I think if a terminally ill person is in a lot of pain and makes a clear decision, they should have a constitutional right to get help dying. The plaintiffs here could make that choice, so I think the law goes too far in completely banning assisted suicide.

Because the right to be free from exposure to contaminated water "is neither implicit in the concept of ordered liberty nor deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition [,][i] t would be an impermissibly radical departure from existing tradition, and from the principles that underlie that tradition, to declare that there is such a fundamental right protected by the Due …

The States express this commitment by other means as well: "[N] early all states expressly disapprove of suicide and assisted suicide either in statutes dealing with durable powers of attorney in health care situations, or in `living will'statutes. In addition, all states provide for the involuntary commitment of persons who may harm themselves as the result of mental illness …

—whereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its course, unencumbered by contrived intervention

The Michigan Supreme Court determined the United States Constitution does not prohibit states from imposing criminal penalties for assisting someone in committing suicide and that assisted suicide is a common law crime in Michigan which may be prosecuted under the common-law savings statute, MCL § 750.505.

—rejecting the common-law definition of "murder" to the extent it could be read to encompass intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide

—finding that the United States Constitution does not prohibit state from imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another in committing suicide, even where defendant merely is involved in events leading up to death, such as providing means

—holding that Dr. Kevorkian may be prosecuted either under a Michigan statute—held to be constitutional—or under the common-law felony of assisting suicide

—enacted in 2008]; Vt Stat Ann, tit 18, ch 113 [enacted in 2013]; California End of Life Option Act, Cal Health & Safety Code part 1.85 [enacted in 2015]; Colo Rev Stat §§ 25-48-101-25-48-123 [enacted in 2016]; DC Act 21-577 [enacted in 2016]), and those courts to have considered this issue with respect to their own state constitutions have rejected similar constitutional …

Furthermore, "[w] hen a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision."

"[T] he test for determining if an amendment or substitute changes a purpose of the bill is whether the subject matter of the amendment or substitute is germane to the original purpose. The test of germaneness is much like the standard for determining whether a bill is limited to a single object."

No, a state law that imposes criminal penalties on a person who assists another in committing suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there is no fundamental right to commit suicide. The court distinguished the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, established in cases like Cruzan, from an affirmative act of suicide. Refusing treatment allows the natural progression of an illness, whereas suicide involves an external, death-inducing agent. The court rejected the argument that the personal autonomy principles in Planned Parenthood v. Casey extend to suicide, noting that such a right is not deeply rooted in the nation's history or tradition, where assisting suicide has long been proscribed. The court also held that under Michigan common law, merely providing the means for a suicide is not murder; the defendant's act must be the 'direct and natural result' of the death to constitute murder. Merely providing the means is the lesser, separate common-law offense of assisting in a suicide.

No, the state law does not violate the constitution. The opinion concurs with the majority that there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide. However, it dissents from the majority's redefinition of the common law of murder. It argues that a person who intentionally and actively participates in the death of another, including providing the means with the intent that death occur, can and should be charged with murder. The author believes Kevorkian's actions, such as inserting the IV and providing the gas mask, constituted sufficient active participation to establish probable cause for murder, and that altering the definition of causation is a dangerous usurpation of the legislative role.

Yes, a state law that completely bans assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause. This opinion dissents from the majority's constitutional holding, arguing that a mentally competent, terminally ill person suffering from great pain does have a fundamental liberty interest in hastening an inevitable death with physician assistance. Relying on the reasoning in Planned Parenthood v. Casey regarding personal autonomy and the 'right to define one's own concept of existence,' the author asserts there is no meaningful distinction between refusing life-sustaining treatment and choosing physician-prescribed medication to end suffering. A complete statutory ban on this practice constitutes an 'undue burden' on this fundamental right.

The assisted suicide statute was validly enacted and does not violate the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution. The United States Constitution does not prohibit a state from imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another in committing suicide. The common-law definition of murder encompasses the act of intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide. The distinction between suicide and the refusal or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment is that the latter allows life to run its course without artificial intervention. In the murder case, People v Roberts is overruled to the extent that it can be read to support the view that the common-law definition of murder encompasses the act of intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide. Only where there is probable cause to believe that death was the direct and natural result of a defendant's act can the defendant be properly bound over on a charge of murder. Where a defendant merely is involved in the events leading up to the death, such as providing the means, the proper charge is assisting in a suicide, which may be prosecuted as a common-law felony under the saving clause in the absence of a statute that specifically prohibits assisting in a suicide. The motion to quash must be reconsidered by the circuit court to determine whether the evidence produced at the preliminary examination was sufficient to bind the defendant over for trial.

I agree that the assisted suicide statute does not violate the Title-Object Clause in its entirety and that it is not violative of a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. I do not agree with the lead opinion's redefinition of the statutory offense of murder to exclude participation in the events leading up to the death, including providing the means and all other acts save that of the final act precipitating death. The acts shown in the Oakland County case establish causation as a matter of law for purposes of bindover. Thus, the trial court erred in quashing the information, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

I dissent from the lead opinion's finding that there is no constitutional right, in any situation, to hasten one's death through physician-prescribed medications. I agree that the assisted suicide act does not violate the Title-Object Clause. I also agree with modifying the common-law definition of murder and recognizing assisting suicide as a common-law offense. A terminally ill individual who is suffering from great pain and who has made a competent decision should have a constitutional due process right to hasten his death. Because plaintiffs are in a position to now make a choice that I believe should survive any challenge from the state, I would hold that the statute represents an undue burden on that right.

People v. Kevorkian

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