People v. Kauten
324 Ill. App. 3d 588, 258 Ill. Dec. 197, 755 N.E.2d 1016 (2001)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A legislature does not violate a state constitution's proportionate penalties clause by imposing a more severe penalty for solicitation of murder than for conspiracy to commit murder or attempted murder. This is permissible because the legislature can rationally conclude that solicitation poses distinct and more serious societal dangers, such as targeting sophisticated criminal masterminds and corrupting otherwise non-criminal individuals.
Facts:
- Bonnie J. Kauten developed the intent for the offense of first-degree murder to be committed.
- Kauten requested, encouraged, or commanded another person to commit that murder.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Bonnie J. Kauten in the circuit court of Du Page County, an Illinois trial court, with solicitation of murder and solicitation of murder for hire.
- Kauten pleaded guilty to solicitation of murder, and in exchange, the State dismissed the charge of solicitation of murder for hire.
- The trial court sentenced Kauten to 18 years' imprisonment.
- Kauten filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court denied.
- Kauten appealed her sentence to the Illinois Appellate Court, arguing for the first time on appeal that the sentencing statute was unconstitutional.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Illinois sentencing statute for solicitation of murder, which imposes a harsher penalty than the statutes for conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rapp
No, the sentencing scheme for solicitation of murder does not violate the proportionate penalties clause. The legislature can rationally conclude that solicitation of murder is a more serious offense than conspiracy to commit murder or attempted murder. The court reasoned that solicitation presents unique dangers not inherent in conspiracy or attempt. It often involves a more sophisticated and planned criminal intent by an actor who tries to insulate themselves by using a hireling, making it a crucial tool for suppressing organized crime leadership. Furthermore, solicitation is an effort to recruit and corrupt an individual who has not yet formed criminal intent, potentially creating a conspiracy or an attempt where none would have otherwise existed. Finally, the law against solicitation serves the distinct purpose of protecting people from the corrupting act of being solicited to commit a crime, a harm separate from the danger to the ultimate victim.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle of legislative deference in the creation of criminal penalties. It establishes that the 'seriousness' of an inchoate offense is not measured solely by the proximity to the completed crime, but also by the distinct social harms it creates. The court's focus on solicitation as a tool of organized crime and its corrupting influence provides a durable rationale for punishing it more severely than other preparatory offenses. This precedent makes it significantly more difficult to challenge sentencing disparities between different inchoate crimes based on a simple comparison of their elements, requiring challengers to address the unique policy goals each statute serves.
