People v. Kaplan
76 N.Y.2d 140, 556 N.E.2d 415, 556 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1990)
Rule of Law:
Accomplice liability under Penal Law § 20.00 requires that an individual intentionally aid a principal and possess the mental culpability required for the commission of the substantive crime, even if that mental culpability is 'knowledge' rather than 'specific intent to sell' for crimes like criminal sale of a controlled substance.
Facts:
- From May 1, 1986, to February 17, 1987, the police investigated a cocaine ring operating out of an office maintained by Mike Kaplan, Murray Kaplan's cousin, in the Empire State Building.
- Detective Janis Grasso, posing as a drug courier for someone named 'Ronnie' from Atlantic City, engaged in a series of transactions, primarily with Mike Kaplan.
- On October 15, 1986, Grasso went to Mike Kaplan's office to purchase 10 ounces of cocaine.
- Upon Grasso's arrival, Mike Kaplan, his brother, and Murray Kaplan were present.
- Mike Kaplan introduced Grasso to Murray Kaplan and told Murray Kaplan 'to take care of the young lady.'
- Murray Kaplan retrieved a manila envelope from a file cabinet in the room and placed it on the desk in front of Grasso.
- Grasso placed $15,000 in prerecorded buy money on the table; Murray Kaplan picked up the money and began counting it.
- Grasso opened the manila envelope, took out a zip-lock plastic bag containing drugs, and placed it into her purse, remarking that 'it looks nice.'
Procedural Posture:
- Murray Kaplan was charged with, inter alia, criminal sale of a controlled substance.
- Prior to the case being submitted to the jury, defense counsel requested the trial court instruct the jurors that, to convict defendant as an accomplice, they must find he had 'specific intent' to sell a controlled substance and 'share the intent or purpose of the principal actors.'
- The trial court denied defendant's request, noting the mental culpability for criminal sale was 'knowledge' not 'intent,' and the standard accomplice charge required proof of 'intentionally aided.'
- Following the court’s charge, the jury found Murray Kaplan guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance.
- The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Murray Kaplan's conviction, without opinion.
- Leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does accomplice liability for criminal sale of a controlled substance, which requires 'knowledge' of the substance, also require proof that the accomplice acted with the 'specific intent to sell' the controlled substance, or is it sufficient that the accomplice 'intentionally aided' the principal while possessing the mental culpability required for the substantive crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Titone, J.
No, accomplice liability for criminal sale of a controlled substance does not require proof that the accomplice acted with the 'specific intent to sell' the controlled substance; it is sufficient that the accomplice 'intentionally aided' the principal while possessing the mental culpability required for the substantive crime. The court affirmed Murray Kaplan's conviction, holding that Penal Law § 20.00 explicitly states an accomplice must act 'with the mental culpability required for the commission' of the substantive crime. For criminal sale of a controlled substance (Penal Law § 220.43), this mental culpability is 'knowledge' (Penal Law § 15.05 [2]), not 'specific intent' (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]). The court clarified that the 'shared intent or purpose' language from prior case law under the former Penal Law merely served to prevent liability for mere presence and is now subsumed within the 'intentionally aided' requirement of Penal Law § 20.00, which imports 'goal-directed conduct.' This standard differentiates accomplice liability from criminal facilitation (Penal Law § 115.05), which only requires a belief that one is probably rendering aid. Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Murray Kaplan, knowing the substance was cocaine, intentionally aided Mike Kaplan by delivering it to Detective Grasso and counting the money, thus meeting the requirements of accomplice liability without needing a specific intent to sell.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the mens rea requirement for accomplice liability under New York's Penal Law § 20.00, particularly for substantive crimes that require 'knowledge' rather than 'specific intent.' It firmly establishes that an accomplice's mental culpability must align with the principal's for the underlying crime, while their actions must constitute 'intentionally aiding.' This ruling prevents the imposition of a higher mens rea standard on an accomplice than on the principal, thereby streamlining the application of accomplice liability. It also provides a critical distinction between accomplice liability and lesser offenses like criminal facilitation, ensuring that active, goal-directed participation in a known crime is appropriately penalized. This precedent is significant for guiding jury instructions and prosecutorial strategies in cases involving accessoryship across various criminal offenses.
