People v. Kanan
526 P.2d 1339, 186 Colo. 255, 1974 Colo. LEXIS 734 (1974)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a prosecution for passing a bad check, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual knowledge of insufficient funds and a specific intent to deceive; this burden cannot be shifted to the defendant through a presumption of knowledge, nor can the specific intent requirement be satisfied by a showing of mere recklessness.
Facts:
- In February 1972, John E. Kanan wrote three separate checks to the ABC Liquor Store over the course of one week.
- The checks, totaling seventy-five dollars, were returned to the store with a notification that Kanan's account had been closed for insufficient funds the previous month, in January.
- The bank had mailed monthly statements to Kanan's address from October through January, each showing the account was overdrawn.
- The bank also mailed a notice of the account's closure to the same address.
- However, the bank statements for December and January were returned to the bank and were not delivered to Kanan, creating conflicting evidence as to his actual knowledge of the account's status.
Procedural Posture:
- John E. Kanan was prosecuted in a Colorado trial court for passing short checks.
- A jury found Kanan guilty of the felony charge.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Kanan to the penitentiary.
- Kanan appealed his conviction to the Colorado Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court gave the jury improper instructions.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Do jury instructions that (1) create a presumption that a person who writes a check knows the status of their account, and (2) define the required 'intent to deceive' to include recklessness, unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant in a bad check case?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Erickson
Yes. The jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, violating the presumption of innocence. The prosecution must prove every element of a crime, including knowledge and specific intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. The first instruction improperly dispensed with the prosecution's obligation to prove Kanan knew his account had insufficient funds by creating a presumption of knowledge, which effectively reversed the burden of proof. The second instruction was also erroneous because the bad check statute requires a 'specific intent to deceive,' and the court improperly lowered this standard by instructing the jury that 'reckless and conscious ignorance' was sufficient. A court cannot alter the specific mental state required by a criminal statute.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the fundamental constitutional principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It specifically prohibits the use of evidentiary presumptions to establish a defendant's mental state, such as knowledge or intent, thereby protecting the presumption of innocence. The decision also clarifies the critical distinction between different levels of criminal intent, holding that where a statute requires a 'specific intent,' a conviction cannot be sustained on proof of a lesser mental state like recklessness. This protects defendants from being convicted of crimes that require a particular culpable mindset without the prosecution having to prove that that mindset actually existed.
