People v. Johnson
26 Cal.3d 557, 606 P.2d 738, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1980)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An appointed defense counsel may not waive an incarcerated client's statutory right to a speedy trial over the client's express objection solely to resolve the counsel's own calendar conflicts. Chronic court congestion or heavy caseloads for public defenders do not constitute 'good cause' to justify trial delays beyond the statutory period for an incarcerated defendant.
Facts:
- Defendant Johnson and two other men entered a Jim Dandy Fast Foods restaurant, while a fourth man remained in a car outside.
- One of Johnson's companions was armed with a shotgun and another was armed with a knife; Johnson was unarmed.
- Johnson and his knife-wielding companion approached a customer, Ms. Watley.
- Johnson turned Ms. Watley around and pushed her against a counter, while his companion took her purse.
- Johnson then told the crying Ms. Watley not to worry and that he would try to get her purse back.
- Johnson's companion also took a bracelet from another customer, Ms. Washington.
- Police later stopped the getaway car, and Johnson was apprehended as he was exiting the vehicle; the other three men escaped.
- A search of the vehicle uncovered the shotgun, two knives, and Ms. Watley’s purse.
Procedural Posture:
- An information was filed against defendant Johnson in superior court.
- Johnson, represented by the public defender, pleaded not guilty and trial was set for March 23.
- On March 23, Johnson's counsel requested a continuance due to his engagement in another trial; the court found good cause and postponed trial over Johnson's express objection.
- On the new trial date of May 6, defense counsel again requested a continuance due to other trial commitments; the court again continued the case over Johnson's objection.
- Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court seeking dismissal on speedy trial grounds, which the court summarily denied.
- After further delays due to court congestion, trial commenced on June 27, 144 days after the information was filed.
- A jury convicted Johnson of three counts of robbery.
- Johnson appealed the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of California.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
May an appointed counsel waive an incarcerated defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial over the defendant's express objection, due to the counsel's scheduling conflicts with other clients, without violating the defendant's rights under Penal Code § 1382?
Opinions:
Majority - Tobriner, J.
No. An appointed counsel's waiver of an incarcerated defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial over the defendant's express objection, due to counsel's own scheduling conflicts, violates the defendant's rights under Penal Code § 1382. An attorney owes undivided loyalty to each client and cannot waive one client's fundamental rights to accommodate the needs of other clients; such a waiver is not a tactical decision but a resolution of a conflict of interest that requires the client's consent. Furthermore, chronic court congestion or an appointed counsel's heavy caseload does not constitute 'good cause' for delaying a trial beyond the statutory limit for an incarcerated defendant, as the state has an obligation to provide sufficient resources to uphold statutory rights. However, the violation does not warrant reversal of the conviction because, under People v. Wilson, a defendant must demonstrate on post-conviction appeal that the delay caused actual prejudice, which Johnson failed to do.
Concurring - Richardson, J.
Yes. An appointed counsel has the authority to waive a defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial as a matter of trial management, even over the defendant's objection. This opinion, concurring only in the judgment to affirm the conviction, argues that the majority wrongly departs from the recent precedent of Townsend v. Superior Court, which held that the 60-day statutory right is not fundamental and is subject to counsel's control. The statutory speedy trial right is merely supplementary to the constitutional right and can be waived by counsel for reasonable purposes, such as resolving calendar conflicts. The majority's holding creates a rigid rule that will lead to the wholesale dismissal of criminal cases due to systemic congestion, a problem that requires a legislative and fiscal solution, not a judicial one that risks public safety.
Concurring - Bird, C. J.
No. The defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, and the majority's refusal to reverse the conviction based on the People v. Wilson prejudice requirement is incorrect. The denial of a fundamental right like a speedy trial is an error so significant that it should be considered prejudicial per se, requiring reversal without any additional showing of harm by the defendant. Requiring a defendant to prove prejudice effectively creates a 'judicial repeal' of the right. It is also fundamentally unfair to penalize a defendant for not seeking a pretrial writ to preserve the issue when it was his own counsel who created the problem by refusing to honor his speedy trial request.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed the authority of appointed counsel, establishing that they cannot waive an incarcerated client's statutory speedy trial right over objection to manage their own caseload. It shifted responsibility for trial delays from the defendant to the state, holding that chronic underfunding of courts and public defender offices is not 'good cause' to deny a speedy trial. However, the ruling's practical impact was limited by its reaffirmation of the Wilson rule, which requires a defendant to prove actual prejudice to win a reversal on appeal. This creates a dichotomy where the right is strongly affirmed in principle, but a violation may have no remedy after a conviction unless specific harm can be demonstrated.
Unlock the full brief for People v. Johnson