People v. John Z.
29 Cal. 4th 756, 60 P.3d 183, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A withdrawal of consent during intercourse nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the individual to forcible rape charges if they continue against the will of the other party.
Facts:
- On March 23, 2000, 17-year-old Laura T. drove Juan G., whom she had met about two weeks earlier, to a party at defendant John Z.'s home.
- During the evening, Laura and Juan went into a bedroom where Juan indicated he wanted to have sex, but Laura told him she was not ready.
- Later, defendant John Z. asked Laura to come into his bedroom to talk. Juan entered, and both boys began kissing Laura and removing her clothes despite her objections.
- Juan forced himself on Laura, but the encounter ended when the condom fell off during her struggling.
- After Juan left, defendant John Z. entered the room naked, pushed Laura back onto the bed, and began having intercourse with her.
- Laura testified she tried to get off him, told him she needed to go home multiple times, and stated that if he cared about her he wouldn't be doing this to her.
- Despite her resistance and verbal objections, defendant continued for about a minute to a minute and a half before finally stopping.
- The juvenile court found that defendant committed forcible rape and committed him to Crystal Creek Boys Ranch.
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Issue:
Is the crime of forcible rape committed if the female victim withdraws her consent during an act of intercourse and the male continues against her will?
Opinions:
Majority - Chin (J.)
Yes. The crime of forcible rape is committed when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act, and the defendant forcibly continues despite the objection. The withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse. We reject the reasoning in People v. Vela (1985), which held that where the victim consents to intercourse at the time of penetration but thereafter withdraws her consent, any use of force past that point is not rape. The essence of the crime of rape is not measured by the victim's level of outrage, but rather by whether the act of sexual intercourse was accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. In this case, substantial evidence shows that Laura withdrew her consent and, through her actions and words, communicated that fact to defendant. No reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed that Laura continued to consent to the act. Even if we were to accept defendant's argument that he should be permitted a 'reasonable amount of time' to withdraw once the female raises an objection, he was clearly given ample time but refused to do so despite Laura's resistance and objections. The force defendant exerted in resisting Laura's attempts to stop the act was clearly ample to satisfy the force requirement under section 261, subdivision (a)(2).
Dissent - Brown (J.)
While I agree that the clear withdrawal of consent nullifies any earlier consent and forcible persistence in what then becomes nonconsensual intercourse is rape, the majority ignores critical questions about the nature and sufficiency of proof in a postpenetration rape case. First, the opinion fails to consider whether the victim's statements in this case clearly communicated her withdrawal of consent. Laura's silent and ineffectual movements could easily be misinterpreted, and none of her statements are unequivocal. They could reasonably be understood as requests for reassurance or demands for speed. Second, there is no attempt to define what constitutes force in this context. It is not clear that Laura was forcibly compelled to continue. All we know is that John Z. did not instantly respond to her statement that she needed to go home. Is persistence the same thing as force? Finally, questions about wrongful intent are given short shrift. The majority does not tell us how soon would have been soon enough for the defendant to desist. Under these circumstances, can the withdrawal of consent serve as a proxy for both compulsion and wrongful intent? Because the record contains no indication the juvenile court considered and resolved these questions, I respectfully dissent.
Analysis:
This case sets a significant precedent that clarifies the legal understanding of consent, emphasizing that consent can be withdrawn at any time during sexual intercourse and that such withdrawal must be respected immediately. The Court explicitly overruled People v. Vela (1985), which had held that rape does not occur if the victim initially consents to penetration but later withdraws consent. The Court rejected the notion that a defendant is entitled to a 'reasonable time' to cease intercourse after consent is withdrawn, emphasizing that continued intercourse after withdrawal of consent constitutes rape if the statutory elements are met. This decision aligns California with several other states that have recognized 'postpenetration rape' as a form of sexual assault, reinforcing the principle that individuals have absolute control over their bodies at all times during a sexual encounter.
