People v. James
93 N.Y.2d 620, 695 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 N.E.2d 1052 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A declarant's statement of intent to engage in future conduct with a third party is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to prove that the joint conduct occurred. Additionally, a statement against penal interest that names a co-perpetrator is admissible without redaction if naming that person is itself inculpatory to the declarant within the context of the statement.
Facts:
- Lieutenant Michael Gordon, a New York City Transit Police officer, was assigned to help draft a promotional sergeant's examination in 1990.
- Defendant Samuel James, David Tarquini, and Lizette Lebrón were officers under Gordon's command who were preparing to take that examination.
- On October 20, 1990, Gordon arranged a meeting at his apartment to illegally disclose the contents of the exam to the officers.
- In an inadvertently recorded phone call that same day, Gordon told Lebrón that defendant James and Tarquini were coming to his house between 11:00 p.m. and midnight for the meeting.
- Lebrón attended the meeting where Gordon distributed questions that would be on the exam, which she and others copied.
- After the cheating scheme was accidentally revealed to Lebrón's boyfriend, Gordon called Lebrón on October 24 and asked her to give her copied notes to defendant James or another officer, Joyce Sellers.
- Defendant James was later called before a Grand Jury and, after receiving immunity, testified under oath that he had never been to Gordon's home in 1990 and did not attend the meeting.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Samuel James was indicted for six counts of perjury based on his Grand Jury testimony.
- Following a jury trial in the state trial court, James was convicted of two counts of perjury in the first degree.
- James, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, granted James leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule permit the admission of a declarant's statement of intent to meet with a non-declarant third party as evidence that the non-declarant also intended to, and did, participate in the meeting?
Opinions:
Majority - Levine, J.
Yes. A declarant’s statement of intent to engage in future conduct with another person is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to prove that the joint conduct occurred. The court formally adopts the doctrine from Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, rejecting the narrow view that such statements can only prove the declarant's solitary future acts. Admissibility requires foundational safeguards, including the declarant's unavailability, a statement contemplating future joint action, and independent evidence of reliability. Here, Gordon's recorded statement that James was coming to his home was admissible to prove the meeting took place as planned. The court further held that Gordon's subsequent statement telling Lebrón to give the incriminating notes to James was admissible as a declaration against penal interest without redacting James's name. Naming James was not neutral; it was self-inculpatory because it identified James as a trusted confederate in Gordon's separate crime of covering up the cheating scheme, thereby making the statement admissible in its entirety.
Analysis:
This decision officially incorporates the full scope of the Hillmon doctrine into New York evidence law, permitting a declarant's statement of intent to be used to prove the subsequent joint actions of both the declarant and a named third party. It establishes a clear, four-part test for the admission of such evidence, balancing its probative value against potential prejudice. The ruling also clarifies the application of the declaration against penal interest exception, rejecting a per se rule requiring redaction of a non-declarant's name and instead mandating a context-specific analysis to determine if naming the accomplice is itself inculpatory. This expands the utility of these hearsay exceptions for prosecutors in cases involving conspiracies or cooperative criminal acts.
