People v. Huston
668 N.E.2d 1362, 646 N.Y.S.2d 69, 88 NY2d 400 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An indictment must be dismissed when a prosecutor's intentional and pervasive misconduct, which usurps the fact-finding function of the Grand Jury and conveys a belief in the defendant's guilt, impairs the integrity of the proceeding and creates a possibility of prejudice to the defendant.
Facts:
- On April 14, 1982, Joshua Samuel Huston's estranged wife, Mary Huston, and her mother, Allison Brown, were murdered in their home.
- On the day of the murders, Huston had been served with divorce papers and had visited his wife's house to discuss them.
- The police investigation went cold for a year and a half before Grand Jury proceedings against Huston commenced in November 1983.
- Before the Grand Jury, Emma Threats testified that Vickie Pickles had told her that Huston appeared at his father's apartment on the night of the murders covered in blood, carrying a knife, and admitting to the crime.
- Vickie Pickles then testified that Huston did arrive with a bloody knife and confessed, saying, "I think I killed them," though she disputed other details of Threats' account.
- Huston's father, Jule Huston, testified that his son never came to the apartment that night and that Pickles was an alcoholic who suffered from hallucinations.
- Physical evidence included sneakers and a jacket belonging to Huston with small amounts of human blood, insufficient for grouping or typing.
- A neighbor testified that she saw Huston arguing with his wife and standing in her driveway on the evening of the murders.
Procedural Posture:
- A Grand Jury indicted Joshua Samuel Huston on two counts of murder in the second degree.
- Huston moved in the trial court to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial misconduct before the Grand Jury.
- The trial court denied the motion.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Huston on both murder counts.
- Huston, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding Huston had not established a possibility of prejudice.
- Huston, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's intentional misconduct before a Grand Jury, including using inadmissible hearsay to influence a witness, expressing personal belief in the defendant's guilt, and usurping the jury's fact-finding role, impair the integrity of the proceeding and create a possibility of prejudice requiring dismissal of the indictment under New York's CPL 210.35(5)?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Kaye
Yes, the prosecutor's misconduct impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury proceeding and created a possibility of prejudice, requiring dismissal of the indictment. The prosecutor's actions were not isolated mistakes but a pervasive pattern of intentional misconduct. He improperly used inadmissible hearsay from witness Emma Threats with the stated purpose of pressuring and influencing the subsequent testimony of Vickie Pickles. The prosecutor also became an unsworn witness by repeatedly telling the Grand Jury that Pickles' version of events was "the truth," vouching for her credibility, and offering his own expert opinion to dismiss jurors' valid concerns about the minimal blood evidence. Furthermore, he engaged in biased and harassing questioning of Jule Huston, a witness whose testimony contradicted the prosecution's theory, thereby usurping the Grand Jury's exclusive role as the judge of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. This cumulative misconduct substantially undermined the integrity of the proceedings and created a clear risk of prejudice, satisfying the standard for dismissal under CPL 210.35(5).
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the high duty of fair dealing imposed on prosecutors and the Grand Jury's role as a shield against unfounded accusations, not merely a tool for the prosecution. The court clarifies that under CPL 210.35(5), the standard for dismissal is a possibility of prejudice, not a requirement of actual prejudice. By dismissing an indictment that was supported by legally sufficient evidence and followed by a conviction, the court establishes that the integrity of the Grand Jury process is a value in itself. This holding signals to lower courts that even a conviction at trial does not cure fundamental defects caused by egregious and intentional prosecutorial misconduct at the Grand Jury stage.
