People v. Hunt
855 N.Y.S.2d 736, 50 A.D.3d 1246 (2008)
Rule of Law:
A defendant challenging a peremptory strike under Batson v. Kentucky must demonstrate a prima facie showing of discrimination by presenting facts beyond merely noting the removal of the sole member of a cognizable racial group. Furthermore, an agency defense in drug sales cases requires the defendant to have acted solely on behalf of the buyer without profiting, and an entrapment defense for possession charges requires active inducement by an official and that the defendant was not otherwise disposed to commit the crime.
Facts:
- The defendant was arrested for selling cocaine to a confidential informant.
- During jury selection, the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to remove the only African American from the jury pool.
- The defendant made a profit from and benefited from the cocaine transaction.
- The defendant admitted to being a cocaine addict and regularly possessed cocaine.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.
- The case was tried in the County Court of Saratoga County (Scarano, J.).
- Defendant requested that the defenses of entrapment and agency be presented to the jury.
- The County Court granted the request for an entrapment instruction only for counts one and two, effectively refusing it for count three and refusing the agency defense instruction entirely.
- The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts.
- Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of six years by the County Court.
- Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
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Issue:
1. Does the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only African American from the jury pool, without more, establish a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky? 2. Is a defendant entitled to an agency defense jury instruction if they profited from the drug transaction? 3. Is a defendant entitled to an entrapment defense jury instruction for a criminal possession charge if they were admittedly predisposed to possess the controlled substance?
Opinions:
Majority - Stein, J.
No, the striking of the sole African American juror, without more, does not establish a prima facie showing of racial discrimination required under Batson v. Kentucky. The defendant must show that 'the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to remove one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that there exist facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race' (People v Jenkins, 84 NY2d 1001, 1002 [1994]). Here, the defendant's Batson challenge was based solely on the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only African American from the jury pool, and no other facts or circumstances were raised to support a finding of racial motivation. No, a defendant is not entitled to an agency defense jury instruction if they profited from the drug transaction. An agency defense requires evidence that the defendant was acting 'solely on behalf of the buyer such as to be a mere extension or instrumentality of the buyer' (People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 446, 449 [1990]). Since the defendant made a profit on and benefited from the transaction, there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant was acting merely as an extension or instrumentality of the buyer. No, a defendant is not entitled to an entrapment defense jury instruction for criminal possession in the fourth degree if they were admittedly predisposed to possess the controlled substance. To establish entrapment, a defendant must demonstrate active inducement by a public official and that such inducement created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a defendant 'not otherwise disposed to commit it' (People v Brown, 82 NY2d 869, 871 [1993], quoting Penal Law § 40.05). The defendant here admitted to being a cocaine addict and regularly possessing cocaine, indicating that they were otherwise disposed to commit the offense, thereby precluding the defense.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the high evidentiary bar for establishing a prima facie Batson violation, emphasizing that merely identifying a single juror of a protected class is insufficient without additional evidence of discriminatory intent. It also reinforces the strict conditions for drug agency and entrapment defenses, making it difficult for defendants who profit from sales or are predisposed to drug-related activities to claim these defenses. The ruling limits the applicability of these defenses, channeling them to situations where the defendant truly acted without self-interest or was genuinely coerced into a crime they otherwise would not have committed. This helps ensure that these defenses are not improperly used to shield individuals engaged in criminal enterprises.
