People v. Hughes
1979 Mich. App. LEXIS 2430, 93 Mich. App. 333, 287 N.W.2d 226 (1979)
Rule of Law:
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in allowing impeachment by a prior felony conviction if it balances the factors affecting credibility and the conviction falls within established time limits; nor does it deny an indigent defendant equal protection by refusing a full transcript of a prior mistrial if substantially equivalent alternative devices are available.
Facts:
- On July 11, 1975, a police officer was fatally shot during the armed robbery of a branch of the National Bank of Ypsilanti.
- Police officer Claudius Wilcox pursued the robbers' automobile as it fled the scene after the robbery.
- Officer Wilcox observed a portion of the driver’s face during the pursuit.
- In November 1963, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder.
- The defendant was paroled on September 23, 1969, following his prior conviction.
- The defendant was discharged from parole after 24 months.
- Since his parole, the defendant had obtained a bachelor’s degree from Wayne State University and entered a master’s degree program at Eastern Michigan University, leading a socially acceptable, crime-free life.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with felony murder.
- The defendant's first trial occurred in September 1976 and ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
- Prior to the retrial, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his prior conviction of second-degree murder if he were to testify.
- The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the prior conviction.
- On January 17, 1977, Richard Zipser, defendant’s retained counsel from the first trial, moved to withdraw from the case.
- On January 26, 1977, the trial judge issued an order granting the motion to withdraw.
- On February 2, 1977, two new counsel were appointed to represent the defendant.
- On March 15, 1977, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a written motion requesting a complete typed transcript of the first trial.
- This motion was heard on April 1, 1977.
- The trial court denied the motion for a complete transcript due to the physical impossibility of transcribing the entire first trial before the scheduled commencement of the retrial, offering instead access to tape recordings and allowing requests for specific excerpts to be transcribed.
- On April 11, 1977, the first day of defendant's retrial, defense counsel again requested a complete transcript of the original trial and asked for a continuance.
- The trial court denied these requests.
- One of defendant's co-counsel later moved for a mistrial on the ground of not having a complete transcript, which the trial judge denied.
- The defendant was convicted by jury on May 4, 1977, of felony murder.
- On June 7, 1977, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and subsequently appealed of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err reversibly by denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his prior 14-year-old second-degree murder conviction for impeachment purposes and by refusing to provide a complete transcript of his first trial to his appointed counsel prior to retrial?
Opinions:
Majority - D. E. Holbrook, J.
No, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his prior conviction, nor did it deny him equal protection by refusing a complete transcript of his first trial. Regarding the prior conviction, the trial judge recognized his discretion, as established in People v. Jackson, 391 Mich 323 (1974), and carefully balanced the potential negative effect of impeachment against the positive aspects of the defendant's anticipated testimony regarding his post-conviction accomplishments. While similar prior convictions require careful consideration, similarity does not automatically bar impeachment. The court also noted that the Michigan Rules of Evidence, MRE 609(b), which became effective after the trial but were under consideration, would not have prohibited the use of the conviction as it fell within the ten-year limit from release from confinement. Regarding the transcript, the court applied the two-factor test from Britt v. North Carolina, 404 US 226 (1971), which considers (1) the value of the transcript and (2) the availability of alternative devices. The defendant had access to a substantially equivalent alternative, including tape recordings of the first trial, partial transcripts of key witnesses like Officer Wilcox, and consultation with his prior counsel. The trial court also cited the physical impossibility of providing a complete transcript in a timely manner and the need to proceed with a speedy trial. Allen, P.J., concurred with this opinion.
Dissenting - T. M. Burns, J.
Yes, the trial court did abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecution to impeach the defendant by reference to his 1963 felony. The 14 years separating the offenses, their similar nature (both murder), the defendant's age of 18 at the time of the prior conviction, and his subsequent socially acceptable, crime-free life, including obtaining a bachelor’s and pursuing a master’s degree, demonstrate that the prejudicial nature of this evidence far outweighed its probative value, as discussed in People v. Jackson, 391 Mich 323 (1974) and People v. Farrar, 36 Mich App 294 (1971). Furthermore, the defendant did not take the stand and testify, which is significant given the close nature of the case, resting largely on the credibility of Officer Wilcox's momentary identification. The fear of impeachment by the prior conviction likely prevented the defendant from presenting his unique knowledge of the events, thereby prejudicing his defense. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error in its ruling on the motion to suppress.
Analysis:
This case provides important guidance on judicial discretion concerning the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment and the scope of an indigent defendant's right to a free trial transcript. It clarifies that while trial courts must carefully balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect of prior convictions, especially old or similar ones, their discretion will be upheld if a reasoned balancing occurs and the conviction meets time limits. The case reaffirms the 'substantially equivalent alternative' standard from Britt v. North Carolina, setting a benchmark for what courts must offer indigent defendants in lieu of a full transcript. Future cases will cite this precedent when evaluating judicial decisions on impeachment evidence and the provision of trial materials, particularly where logistical constraints make a full transcript impractical, and alternative resources are offered.
