People v. Howard
34 Cal. 4th 1129, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 104 P.3d 107 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A felony does not qualify as inherently dangerous for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule if, when viewed in the abstract, the statute defining the crime can be violated in a manner that does not create a substantial risk to human life.
Facts:
- California Highway Patrol Officer Gary Stephany observed defendant Howard driving a Chevrolet Tahoe without a rear license plate and initiated a traffic stop.
- Howard initially stopped but then sped away when officers exited their patrol car, leading them on a chase at speeds up to 90 miles per hour.
- During the chase, Howard ran two stop signs and a red light, drove on the wrong side of the road, and turned off his vehicle's headlights before temporarily escaping.
- Minutes later, Officer Anthony Arcelus spotted the Tahoe and resumed the pursuit, during which Howard again drove over 80 miles per hour with his headlights off and ran another stop sign and traffic light.
- Fearing an accident as Howard headed toward downtown Fresno, Officer Arcelus terminated the pursuit.
- Approximately one minute after the police stopped their chase, Howard ran a red light and collided with a car driven by Jeanette Rodriguez.
- Rodriguez was killed in the collision, and it was later determined the Tahoe Howard was driving had been stolen.
Procedural Posture:
- Howard was charged in trial court with murder, causing serious bodily injury while evading a police officer, and evading a police officer with willful or wanton disregard for safety.
- The trial court instructed the jury on a second degree felony-murder theory, stating that a violation of Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is an inherently dangerous felony.
- A jury found Howard guilty on all counts.
- Howard appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal, as the intermediate appellate court, affirmed the conviction, holding that § 2800.2 is an inherently dangerous felony.
- The Supreme Court of California, the state's highest court, granted Howard's petition for review.
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Issue:
Does the crime of driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (Vehicle Code § 2800.2) qualify as a felony inherently dangerous to human life for the purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Kennard, J.
No, the crime of driving with a willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing a police officer is not an inherently dangerous felony for the purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule. This determination must be made by looking at the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the specific conduct of the defendant. The statute, Vehicle Code § 2800.2, was amended to include subdivision (b), which defines 'willful or wanton disregard' to include committing three or more traffic violations assigned a point count or causing any damage to property. Because several point-count violations (such as failing to signal a turn or driving an unregistered vehicle) can be committed without endangering human life, the statute as a whole cannot be deemed inherently dangerous in the abstract. Therefore, the felony-murder rule, which this court has repeatedly stated 'deserves no extension beyond its required application,' cannot be applied to a killing that occurs during a violation of this statute.
Dissenting - Baxter, J.
Yes, the crime as committed by the defendant is inherently dangerous and should support a felony-murder conviction. The majority incorrectly focuses on a technicality in subdivision (b) of the statute, which was never mentioned at trial. The defendant was convicted under subdivision (a) for driving with 'a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons,' which is, by its very definition, inherently dangerous. Society has declared this specific conduct felonious and dangerous, putting the defendant on notice. Furthermore, any instructional error was harmless because the jury's finding that the defendant acted with 'a conscious disregard for the safety of persons' is functionally equivalent to the finding of implied malice required for a traditional second degree murder conviction, and the evidence of such malice was overwhelming.
Concurring - Brown, J.
No, the conviction for second degree felony murder must be reversed, but the majority's reasoning is flawed. While I agree with the dissent that a commonsense reading of the statute indicates that fleeing police with wanton disregard for safety is inherently dangerous, the real issue is the second degree felony-murder rule itself. The fact that reasonable judges can disagree so fundamentally about whether this felony is 'inherently dangerous' demonstrates that the doctrine is unworkably arbitrary and analytically suspect. Instead of engaging in a 'technical parsing' of the statute, this court should abrogate the nonstatutory, judge-made second degree felony-murder rule entirely and leave it to the Legislature to define such crimes.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the second degree felony-murder rule in California, particularly in cases involving high-speed police pursuits. By requiring a strict 'in the abstract' analysis of the entire statute, including all possible non-dangerous ways it can be violated, the court makes it much more difficult for prosecutors to use the rule as a shortcut to a murder conviction. The ruling forces prosecutors in such cases to prove implied malice—that the defendant acted with a conscious disregard for human life—rather than relying on the strict liability of the felony-murder doctrine. This holding underscores the judiciary's long-standing skepticism toward the felony-murder rule and its commitment to confining the doctrine's reach.
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