The People v. Albert Cecil Howard

Supreme Court of California
1 Cal. 4th 1132 (1992) 824 P.2d 1315 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (1992)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A trial court's failure to expressly admonish a defendant on the privilege against self-incrimination before accepting an admission of a prior conviction does not require automatic reversal. Instead, the error is subject to harmless error analysis, and the admission is valid if the record affirmatively shows it was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.

Facts:

On May 25, 1982, Albert Cecil Howard and his half-brother, Ernest Malone, left a party in Tulare for approximately 45 minutes.
Upon returning, Howard told other partygoers that he had "gotten some money" and had "stomped" a man with his foot to prevent being identified.
The next day, Howard provided more detail to his sister-in-law, explaining that he and Malone had knocked on an old man's door and that Howard had stomped the man after he was hit and grabbed Howard's leg.
Roy Fried, 74, and Gladys Fried, 71, lived one block from the party and were discovered in their ransacked home on the afternoon of May 26.
Roy Fried was dead and Gladys Fried was severely injured; a large amount of cash and Roy's wallet were missing.
An autopsy revealed Roy Fried died from multiple forceful blows consistent with being stomped, and his face had a distinct curlicue pattern of bruises.
When Howard was arrested, police found a pair of wing tip loafers in his car that had a decorative curlicue pattern matching the bruises on Roy Fried's face.
Howard, who was barefoot at the time of his arrest, had asked an officer to retrieve those specific shoes from his car.

Procedural Posture:

A jury in the Superior Court of Tulare County convicted defendant Albert Cecil Howard of the first degree murder of Roy Fried and the attempted murder of Gladys Fried, among other charges.
The jury found true the special circumstances of murder during the commission of robbery and burglary, and murder for financial gain.
Defendant admitted a special allegation that he had served a prior prison term for burglary.
At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.
The trial court denied the automatic motion for modification of the verdict and sentenced the defendant to death.
An automatic appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of California.

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Issue:

Does a trial court's failure to expressly advise a defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination before accepting an admission of a prior conviction require automatic reversal, even if the record shows the admission was voluntary and intelligent?

Opinions:

Majority - Panelli, J.

No. A trial court's failure to expressly advise a defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination before accepting an admission of a prior conviction does not require automatic reversal if the plea is otherwise voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. This decision overrules prior precedent that treated such an error as reversible per se. The court abandons its strict interpretation of Boykin v. Alabama, as articulated in In re Tahl and In re Yurko, and adopts the prevailing federal standard. While trial courts in California are still required under the court's supervisory powers to give explicit admonitions of all three Boykin/Tahl rights (jury trial, confrontation, and self-incrimination), a failure to do so is now subject to harmless error review. In this case, the record shows Howard's admission was voluntary and intelligent because the court informed him of his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction and his right to confront witnesses, which sufficiently demonstrates he knew he was not obligated to admit it. Therefore, the error was harmless. The court also reversed the attempted murder and attempted mayhem convictions due to flawed aiding-and-abetting instructions but affirmed the murder conviction and the judgment of death.

Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mosk, J.

The opinion concurs in the judgment as to guilt but dissents as to the penalty. Regarding the central issue, the dissent agrees the error was harmless but disagrees with the majority's decision to overturn the well-settled Yurko/Tahl rule. Instead of adopting the 'totality of the circumstances' test, the dissent would find the trial court substantially complied with its duty because telling the defendant he could force the prosecution to prove the prior implicitly informed him of his right to remain silent. The dissent argues that the death penalty verdict is constitutionally unreliable because the defendant refused to allow his counsel to present available mitigating evidence, which turns the penalty phase into an 'empty charade' and is tantamount to allowing a defendant to 'plead death.'

Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kennard, J.

The opinion concurs in the judgment but dissents from the majority's reasoning on the Wheeler/Batson issue. The dissent argues that Howard did establish a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection because the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove the only two African-American prospective jurors, the defendant was African-American while the victims were White, and the questioning of these jurors was desultory. Therefore, the trial court erred by not requiring the prosecutor to state his reasons for the strikes. However, the dissent finds the error was not reversible because the prosecutor voluntarily filed a declaration providing plausible, race-neutral reasons for the challenges, which the defense did not rebut, thus satisfying the prosecutor's burden.

Analysis:

This case significantly altered California criminal procedure by replacing the rigid, per se reversal rule for Boykin/Tahl errors with the more flexible federal 'totality of the circumstances' test. This change makes it more difficult for defendants to challenge guilty pleas or admissions of priors based on technical omissions in the plea colloquy, shifting the focus to whether the waiver of rights was substantively knowing and voluntary. The decision also strongly reaffirms the precedent from People v. Lang, holding that a competent capital defendant maintains ultimate control over their defense and can prevent counsel from presenting mitigating evidence, even if it leads to a death sentence, without rendering the verdict constitutionally unreliable.

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