People v. Hernández Ríos
151 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
California's CALCRIM jury instructions on reasonable doubt (No. 220), flight as consciousness of guilt (No. 372), and the right to self-defense for mutual combatants (No. 3471) do not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof, lower the prosecution's burden, or violate due process, as they are consistent with established legal principles and prior approved instructions.
Facts:
- Juan José Hernández Ríos, Jesús Patiño, Rosa Alcárez, and Fructoso Mercado were at a bar.
- A bar fight began between Ríos and Patiño, escalating with the use of bottles.
- Alcárez testified that Patiño threw an intact bottle at Ríos, hitting him in the shoulder.
- Ríos then picked up the broken bottle and struck Patiño in the cheek and neck area.
- Patiño died from a severed jugular vein.
- Other witnesses testified to seeing Ríos and Patiño fighting with bottles, Ríos breaking a bottle, and Ríos hitting Patiño.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury found Juan José Hernández Ríos guilty of voluntary manslaughter with personal use of a deadly weapon in the trial court (court of first instance).
- The trial court sentenced Ríos to an aggregate seven-year sentence.
- Ríos appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, challenging three specific Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM).
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Issue:
1. Does CALCRIM No. 220's instruction to the jury to 'compare and consider all the evidence' impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense by allowing the jury to hold against the defense the absence of defense evidence? 2. Does CALCRIM No. 372's instruction allowing the jury to infer from a defendant's flight after a crime that he was 'aware of his guilt' impermissibly presume guilt and lower the prosecution’s burden of proof? 3. Does CALCRIM No. 3471's language regarding the use of deadly force in self-defense by a defendant who started a fight with nondeadly force violate the defendant's rights to due process, confrontation, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
Opinions:
Majority - Gomes, J.
No, CALCRIM No. 220 does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof. The court found that the grammatical differences between CALCRIM No. 220's requirement for the jury to "compare and consider all the evidence" and CALJIC No. 2.90's "entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence" were immaterial. Both instructions explicitly told the jurors that their conclusion must be based on the evidence presented in the case, consistent with Victor v. Nebraska. The standard of review for an ambiguous instruction is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied it in a way that denied fundamental fairness, and here, no such denial occurred. No, CALCRIM No. 372 does not impermissibly presume guilt or lower the prosecution’s burden of proof. The court reasoned that allowing a jury to infer "awareness of guilt" from flight is constitutionally permissible, just as inferring "consciousness of guilt" from flight was upheld in People v. Mendoza. The terms "aware of his guilt" and "consciousness of guilt" are essentially synonymous. The court also cited People v. Navarette to reject the argument that the instruction lowers the prosecution's burden by not requiring a prior finding of a guilty conscience before considering flight evidence; this would turn the instruction on its head. No, CALCRIM No. 3471's language concerning self-defense for a defendant who started a fight with nondeadly force did not violate Rios's rights because the instruction was ultimately irrelevant to the facts of his case. The court found no substantial evidence in the record that Patiño's action of throwing a beer bottle, whether it hit Rios or not, constituted "such sudden and deadly force" that Rios could not withdraw from the fight. The jury's verdict of voluntary manslaughter indicated a rejection of his self-defense claim, and his attorney even characterized the crime as "voluntary manslaughter in perhaps its purest form, the heat of passion kind of voluntary manslaughter." Therefore, the issue with the instruction, even if there were one, did not prejudice the defendant.
Analysis:
This case is significant for upholding the constitutionality and proper application of several new CALCRIM jury instructions, particularly by directly comparing them to their CALJIC predecessors. The California Court of Appeal clarified that minor linguistic differences between the old and new instructions did not create new constitutional infirmities concerning the burden of proof or the presumption of guilt. This ruling reinforces the judiciary's deference to properly formulated jury instructions and provides guidance on how to interpret and apply specific CALCRIM instructions in criminal trials, ensuring consistency in legal standards while transitioning to newer instructional language. Future cases will continue to rely on this precedent when challenging the validity or application of CALCRIM instructions on similar grounds.
