People v. Heidgen
3 N.E.3d 657, 22 N.Y.3d 259 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
In rare and exceptionally egregious cases, a defendant's prolonged, conscious, and extreme level of reckless conduct while voluntarily intoxicated can constitute legally sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life required for a second-degree murder conviction.
Facts:
- In People v. Heidgen, Martin Heidgen consumed at least 20 alcoholic drinks, resulting in a .28% BAC. He then drove his pickup truck the wrong way on the Meadowbrook Parkway for approximately 2.5 miles at speeds of 70-80 mph, ignoring multiple 'wrong way' signs and other drivers' horns. Witnesses testified that Heidgen appeared to 'follow' or 'track' the headlights of oncoming vehicles before crashing head-on into a limousine, killing the driver and a seven-year-old passenger.
- In People v. Taylor, Taliyah Taylor consumed Ecstasy, marijuana, and beer. She then drove a car at 80-90 mph on a local 35-mph street at night without headlights and on the wrong side of the road. She struck and killed a pedestrian without slowing, swerving, or sounding her horn, and subsequently crashed into another vehicle. She later told police she 'saw him and then he was gone.'
- In People v. McPherson, Franklin McPherson, after arguing with his girlfriend and firing several gunshots in a nightclub parking lot, drove with a .19% BAC. He traveled the wrong way on the Southern State Parkway for about five miles at 70-75 mph, passing eight 'wrong way' signs and ignoring the prolonged blast of a truck's air horn. He made no attempt to avoid other vehicles before crashing head-on into a Jeep, killing its driver.
Procedural Posture:
- In People v. Heidgen, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges after a jury trial in the county court. His post-trial motion to set aside the verdict was denied. Heidgen, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction with one Justice dissenting. The dissenting Justice granted Heidgen leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
- In People v. Taylor, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges after a jury trial in the supreme court. Taylor, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Taylor leave to appeal.
- In People v. McPherson, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges after a jury trial in the county court. McPherson, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction with one Justice dissenting. The dissenting Justice granted McPherson leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does driving a vehicle in a wantonly reckless manner while severely intoxicated, resulting in death, constitute legally sufficient evidence to establish the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life required for a conviction of second-degree murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Lippman
Yes. While intoxicated driving cases resulting in death will rarely support a depraved indifference murder charge, the evidence in these exceptionally egregious cases was legally sufficient for a jury to find the defendants possessed the requisite mental state. Depraved indifference is a culpable mental state characterized by an 'utter disregard for the value of human life.' Unlike in People v. Valencia, where the fact-finder determined the defendant was 'oblivious' to the risks, the juries here were entitled to reject the defense that intoxication prevented the defendants from forming the requisite mens rea. The circumstantial evidence in each case—including the prolonged duration of dangerous driving, ignoring multiple warnings, and in Heidgen's case, appearing to 'track' other vehicles—allowed a rational jury to conclude that the defendants were aware of the grave risk they were creating and proceeded with a 'don't care' attitude, which is the equivalent of an intentional murderer's culpability.
Dissenting - Judge Smith
No. The evidence in these cases is insufficient to prove depraved indifference murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The simplest and most likely inference from the defendants' conduct is that they were so intoxicated they did not know what they were doing, not that they consciously disregarded the risks. The majority departs from the rigor of prior cases like People v. Valencia, which is indistinguishable from Heidgen and McPherson. The evidence suggesting Heidgen was playing 'chicken' is too thin for a criminal conviction. As for Taylor, while she was aware of her actions, she was in such a mentally unhinged and abnormal state that her conduct cannot be described as the cold-blooded state of mind that constitutes depraved indifference. All three convictions should be reduced to manslaughter.
Dissenting - Judge Read
No. The majority has effectively resurrected the overruled standard from People v. Register, which hinged on an objective assessment of risk rather than the subjective culpable mental state required by People v. Feingold. The legislature, responding directly to the Court's post-Feingold jurisprudence, has already addressed the proper way to punish such conduct by creating the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class B felony. By reinterpreting the second-degree murder statute to uphold these convictions, the majority is departing from both precedent and legislative intent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the high but not insurmountable bar for proving depraved indifference murder in intoxicated driving cases. The court affirmed that the mens rea standard from People v. Feingold (a subjective 'utter disregard for the value of human life') remains controlling, rejecting a return to the objective standard of People v. Register. The significance lies in the court's holding that a defendant's extremely egregious and prolonged course of conduct can serve as powerful circumstantial evidence of their subjective awareness and indifference, allowing a jury to reject the defense that intoxication rendered them merely 'oblivious.' This carves out a narrow path for murder convictions in the most extreme vehicular homicide cases, distinct from the more common charge of manslaughter or the statutory crime of aggravated vehicular homicide.
