People v. Hansen
885 P.2d 1022 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
The offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling is an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule. This offense does not merge with a resulting homicide, as it is not a mere felonious assault but a crime with a collateral purpose that supports the application of the felony-murder doctrine.
Facts:
- Michael Hansen, along with two companions, planned to purchase methamphetamine.
- Hansen went to an apartment duplex and was approached by Michael Behaves, who offered to procure the drugs.
- Hansen gave Behaves $40, but Behaves took the money and did not return.
- Angered by the theft, Hansen and his companions acquired a handgun.
- The men decided to return to Behaves's apartment with the objective of either recovering the money or physically assaulting Behaves.
- Hansen drove to the apartment building with his car lights off and fired the handgun repeatedly at the dwelling.
- Inside the apartment, 13-year-old Diane Rosalez, Behaves's stepdaughter, was struck in the head by one of the bullets and killed.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Hansen was charged in a California trial court with second degree murder and discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling.
- The jury found Hansen guilty on both counts and found true an allegation that he personally used a firearm.
- Hansen, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court) affirmed the second degree murder conviction but struck the firearm-use enhancement.
- The People and Hansen both sought review in the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does the offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (Pen. Code, § 246) qualify as an inherently dangerous felony that does not merge with the resulting homicide, thereby supporting a conviction for second degree felony murder?
Opinions:
Majority - George, J.
Yes, the offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling is an inherently dangerous felony that does not merge with a resulting homicide. First, the offense, viewed in the abstract, carries a 'high probability' that death will result because an inhabited dwelling is one where people reside and are generally in or around the premises. Second, the merger doctrine established in People v. Ireland, which applies to felonious assaults, does not apply here. Unlike a simple assault, discharging a firearm at a dwelling is not an offense that would cause the felony-murder rule to usurp the law of homicide for the great majority of cases. Application of the rule in this context serves its deterrent purpose without subverting the legislative intent for punishing assaultive conduct, as this is not a situation where the Legislature has demanded a showing of actual malice for a murder conviction.
Concurring - Werdegar, J.
Yes. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, this opinion would adhere more closely to the 'collateral and independent felonious design' test from People v. Mattison. The evidence shows Hansen had an independent felonious design—to intimidate Behaves by shooting at his house. This collateral purpose is sufficient to prevent the underlying felony from merging with the homicide. There is no risk of anomalous results, as a person who acts with an intent to injure would likely be guilty of murder under an implied malice theory anyway.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mosk, J.
No. First, discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling is not an inherently dangerous felony because the statutory definition includes dwellings that are unoccupied, where the probability of death is zero. Thus, it cannot be said that the offense, in the abstract, carries a 'high probability' of death. Second, even if it were inherently dangerous, the felony merges with the homicide. The record shows a single course of conduct with the single purpose of committing the assault that resulted in death, with no independent felonious purpose. Therefore, the second degree felony-murder instruction was erroneous.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kennard, J.
No. While the offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling is an inherently dangerous felony, it merges with the resulting homicide under the doctrine of People v. Ireland. The prosecution's evidence showed no independent felonious purpose beyond the assault itself. Hansen's conduct was a willful act likely to result in physical force against another. Because the felony was an integral part of the homicide and was not committed for an independent purpose, it cannot support a felony-murder conviction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the scope of the felony-murder merger doctrine in California, confining it primarily to simple felonious assaults. By holding that discharging a firearm at a dwelling has a purpose independent of assault (e.g., intimidation), the court established this crime as a valid predicate for second degree felony murder. This ruling strengthens the felony-murder rule's application to violent acts that fall short of the enumerated first degree felonies, making it easier for prosecutors to secure murder convictions in cases like drive-by shootings without needing to prove malice aforethought.
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