People v. Haney
333 N.Y.S.2d 403, 284 N.E.2d 564, 30 N.Y.2d 328 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death created by their conduct can constitute criminally negligent homicide if that failure is a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe.
Facts:
- Angela Palazzo stepped off a city bus at an intersection.
- After the bus departed, the traffic signal turned green in Palazzo's favor, and she began to cross the street in the crosswalk.
- Booker W. Haney, driving a car described as "coming fast," approached the intersection.
- An eyewitness did not hear a horn or the screeching of brakes before impact.
- Haney's vehicle struck and killed Palazzo while she was in the middle of the street.
- After hitting Palazzo, Haney's car continued on until it crashed into a utility pole.
- A police investigation determined from lengthy skid marks that Haney's car was traveling at least 52 miles per hour.
- After his arrest, Haney repeatedly stated, "I didn’t mean to hit her, I didn’t mean to hit her."
Procedural Posture:
- A Grand Jury indicted Booker W. Haney for criminally negligent homicide.
- Haney moved to dismiss the indictment in the Supreme Court, Criminal Term (the trial court).
- The Supreme Court, Criminal Term, dismissed the indictment, finding the evidence legally insufficient.
- The People (the prosecution), as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Appellate Division (the intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment.
- The People, as appellant, were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is evidence that a defendant was speeding, ran a red light, and struck and killed a pedestrian who had the right-of-way sufficient to support a grand jury indictment for criminally negligent homicide?
Opinions:
Majority - Jasen, J.
Yes. The evidence is sufficient to support a grand jury indictment for criminally negligent homicide. Criminal negligence requires that a defendant fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that this failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. This mental state is distinct from recklessness, where a person is aware of a risk and consciously disregards it. While not every careless act resulting in death is criminal, the totality of the circumstances here—speeding at over 50 mph, running a red light, and striking a pedestrian in a crosswalk with no apparent visual obstructions—is evidence of a flagrant disregard for safety that a jury could find to be a gross deviation from the standard of reasonable care. This conduct rises above ordinary civil negligence and is sufficient for a grand jury to find prima facie proof that the crime was committed.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the standard for criminally negligent homicide under the revised New York Penal Law, particularly in the context of vehicular deaths. By reinstating the indictment, the court affirmed that a combination of significant traffic law violations can elevate a defendant's conduct from civil negligence to criminal culpability. The decision solidifies the statutory distinction between the mental states of recklessness (conscious disregard of a known risk) and criminal negligence (a culpable failure to perceive a risk), providing a precedent for prosecutors to bring homicide charges in cases of extremely dangerous driving, even without proof the driver intended any harm.
