People v. Gutierrez
200 P.3d 847, 45 Cal. 4th 789, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A hearsay statement made two months after a startling event is not admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, even when the declarant is a young child, because the significant passage of time allows for the return of reflective powers, thereby negating the spontaneity required for the exception.
Facts:
- Alfred Anthony Gutierrez had a son with his ex-girlfriend, Dawn Nakatani, and was upset with her for not letting him see the child.
- On September 30, 1996, Gutierrez called Nakatani's sister and threatened that if she did not talk to Nakatani, he would "take care of her his way."
- On October 1, 1996, Gutierrez and two unnamed men went to Nakatani’s home, where Gutierrez and Nakatani engaged in a physical altercation.
- Gutierrez left the home with their three-year-old son, while the two men remained inside with Nakatani for one to two minutes before leaving.
- Minutes later, Nakatani's roommate found her unconscious in the laundry room with a bandana tied tightly around her neck; Nakatani later died from ligature strangulation.
- On October 11, 1996, Gutierrez shot at a car at a gas station with an AK-47-type rifle, killing Mario Orellano and injuring Sergio Medina.
- On December 7, 1996, approximately two months after the murder, Gutierrez's son told his aunt, Kim Pinto, that he saw his "daddy and his mean friend tie[] up my mommy."
- While incarcerated, prison officials found notes written by Gutierrez that identified witnesses in the Orellano murder, provided maps to their homes, and directed an associate to "solve this problem."
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in a California superior court (trial court) convicted Alfred Anthony Gutierrez of second degree murder, first degree murder, and attempted murder.
- The jury found true several sentencing enhancements, including a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation.
- Following a penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.
- The trial court denied Gutierrez's post-trial motions for a new trial and for sentence modification.
- Gutierrez's appeal to the Supreme Court of California is automatic under state law for death penalty cases.
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Issue:
Does a three-year-old child's out-of-court statement, made two months after witnessing his mother's murder, qualify as a spontaneous declaration admissible under the hearsay exception (Evidence Code § 1240)?
Opinions:
Majority - Moreno, J.
No, the child's statement does not qualify as a spontaneous declaration. A statement is only admissible under this hearsay exception if it was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event, with their reflective powers in abeyance. Here, the statement was made two months after the event. Unlike in prior cases like People v. Trimble, where a child's statement was admitted after a delay, this child was not sequestered with the alleged perpetrator and had numerous opportunities to confide in trustworthy relatives. The two-month lapse is too substantial to conclude the child was still operating under the immediate stress of the event without the opportunity for reflection. However, the erroneous admission of this statement was harmless error under People v. Watson because the jury convicted Gutierrez of second-degree murder, likely on an aider-and-abettor theory, which was supported by overwhelming circumstantial evidence, including his threats, his presence at the scene moments before the crime, and his jailhouse statements.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the temporal boundaries of the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, particularly for child declarants. The court distinguishes its holding from precedents that allowed delayed statements, narrowing the application of cases like People v. Trimble to situations where a child's first opportunity for disclosure is delayed by confinement with the perpetrator. By finding a two-month delay too long, the court reinforces that the core requirement of the exception—a mental state dominated by excitement where reflective powers are stilled—is paramount and not overridden by the declarant's youth alone. This case serves as an important limitation on the admissibility of delayed child hearsay, emphasizing a fact-specific inquiry into the child's circumstances following the traumatic event.
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