People v. Gudiel
___ Cal.App.5th ___ (2024)
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Rule of Law:
Direct aiding and abetting an implied malice second-degree murder remains a valid theory of liability under California law after the enactment of Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill 775, requiring the aider and abettor to personally act with conscious disregard for human life while aiding a life-endangering act.
Facts:
- Fredy Cordero Gudiel, William Torres, and Pedro Pena were members of the West Side Locos gang.
- On October 6, 2004, Gudiel called from his girlfriend’s house in rival Toonerville gang territory, asking to be picked up because he was having trouble with some guys.
- Babayan, Torres, and Pena drove to pick up Gudiel; Babayan observed a wooden Dodger mini-bat and a duffle bag in the car, and later an aluminum bat during the altercation.
- Shortly after picking up Gudiel, they encountered William Maldonado riding a bicycle; Torres made a U-turn and pulled up to Maldonado.
- Either Torres or Pena shouted, “Where are you from?” to which Maldonado replied “Toonerville” and reached towards his backpack.
- Torres, Pena, and Gudiel got out of the car; Pena hit Maldonado with a bat, knocking him off his bike, and Torres hit him with the Dodger mini-bat, which shattered.
- As Maldonado tried to get up, Gudiel hit him in the face, twice on the chest, kicked him in the stomach, then picked up Maldonado’s bicycle and threw it at him, hitting his leg and landing on his body.
- Maldonado was screaming in pain and bleeding, and died four days later from blunt head trauma caused by a blunt object behind his left ear; Gudiel later told police Maldonado was attacked because he claimed Toonerville and admitted knowing he would have to kill a rival gang member.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 24, 2007, a jury in the Los Angeles County Superior Court (trial court/court of first instance) convicted Fredy Cordero Gudiel of second-degree murder and found a criminal street gang enhancement.
- Gudiel was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison.
- Gudiel's conviction was affirmed in full by the California Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court) on July 10, 2009 (People v. Gudiel et al., B201995 [nonpub. opn.]).
- On January 10, 2022, Gudiel filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
- The trial court appointed counsel, and the People filed a response to the petition on June 17, 2022.
- At a hearing on October 13, 2022, the trial court set November 17, 2022, for a "possible prima facie hearing," indicating it was prepared to summarily deny the petition without a special showing of imputed malice.
- During a hearing on February 6, 2023, the trial court clarified that it had apparently ruled that the petition passed the prima facie phase and proceeded as if an order to show cause (OSC) had been issued.
- On May 5, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, considering the record of conviction, which included jury instructions and the initial trial transcript; no new evidence was offered by either party.
- The trial court denied the petition, finding that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied malice murder.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err in denying Fredy Cordero Gudiel's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, based on a finding that he could still be convicted of implied malice second-degree murder through direct aiding and abetting?
Opinions:
Majority - Stratton, P. J.
No, the trial court did not err in denying Gudiel's petition because substantial evidence supports the finding that he aided and abetted an implied malice second-degree murder. The court cited People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850, which confirmed that aiding and abetting an implied malice murder remains valid post-Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill 775. The reasoning in People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 defines the elements for direct aiding and abetting an implied malice murder: the aider and abettor must aid the commission of a life-endangering act, know the perpetrator intended to commit that act, intend to aid the perpetrator, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act with conscious disregard for human life. The court found Gudiel met these elements because he knew his codefendants intended life-threatening violence when they exited the car with bats, saw them beating Maldonado, and with conscious disregard for Maldonado’s life, intentionally joined the attack by punching and kicking him and throwing a heavy bicycle on him as he lay bleeding and screaming. The court emphasized that Gudiel's act of throwing the bike need not be the actual cause of death; his role in preventing Maldonado from escaping or defending himself while the life-endangering assault occurred was sufficient. Furthermore, the court correctly distinguished the 'reckless indifference to human life' standard, applicable to felony murder special circumstances under cases like People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, from the 'conscious disregard for human life' standard required for implied malice murder, stating they have distinct functions and purposes and that reckless indifference demands a higher degree of risk awareness.
Concurring - Wiley, J.
Yes, the trial court was correct to deny Gudiel's petition, but the majority's distinction between 'reckless indifference to human life' and 'conscious disregard for human life' is unfounded. Justice Wiley argues these phrases have the same meaning, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's use of 'conscious disregard' to define 'reckless indifference' in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. Both phrases, he contends, expound the same core concept of recklessness, and there is no practical difference in conduct that would satisfy one but not the other. Applying the principles of Clark, Gudiel's high level of participation in the assault—witnessing the violent beating with bats, joining in by kicking and punching Maldonado, improvising a heavy bicycle as a weapon, and his stated willingness to kill rival gang members—demonstrates that he acted with both reckless indifference and conscious disregard for human life. Therefore, any perceived error by the trial court in stating it did not apply Clark was harmless, as its analysis effectively aligned with the standards articulated in that case.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the continued viability of direct aiding and abetting liability for implied malice second-degree murder following significant amendments to California's murder laws (SB 1437 and SB 775). It clarifies that an aider and abettor need not inflict the fatal blow but must personally harbor the mental state of conscious disregard for life and actively aid a life-endangering act. The majority's clear distinction between 'conscious disregard' for implied malice and 'reckless indifference' for felony murder special circumstances provides important guidance for future cases, even as the concurring opinion argues for their equivalence, highlighting an ongoing point of contention in legal interpretation regarding mental states for murder liability.
