People v. Gray

California Supreme Court
118 P.3d 496, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 451, 37 Cal.4th 168 (2005)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit peremptory challenges based on race, and a prima facie case is established by facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. In felony-murder cases where the jury is instructed solely on first-degree murder, Penal Code section 1157 (reducing an unspecified murder verdict to the lesser degree) does not apply. Evidence of highly similar prior unadjudicated crimes is admissible to prove identity and intent under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).

Facts:

On April 23, 1987, Michael Barry, Joan Darling, Barbara Hostetler (and her family), Kathryn Patchin, and Letitia Larson (and her family) experienced home invasions or burglaries in the Walnut/Lycoming Street area, with money stolen and similar methods of entry, and Mario Lewis Gray's fingerprints were found at the Hostetler home.
On April 25, 1987, 87-year-old Ruby Reed was found dead in her El Monte trailer home by her daughter, Margaret Pemberton; Reed's hands and feet had been bound, her mouth taped, nightgown pulled up, and underwear around one leg, with money missing and the home ransacked.
Dr. Solomon Riley, a medical examiner, determined Reed died of asphyxiation from neck compression and suffered blunt trauma to her face, head, and chest.
Police found a Frontier Hotel receipt bearing the name 'Lewis Gray' (with defendant's fingerprint) and an RTD bus transfer (valid until 4:20 a.m. on April 25) at Reed's home, linking the location to the defendant's sister's nearby residence.
Defendant checked out of the Frontier Hotel as 'Lewis Gray' at 8:01 a.m. on April 25, then checked back into the same hotel at 7:58 a.m. under the name 'Mario Davis,' and later that morning obtained an identification card from USC Medical Center as 'Mario Davis.'
Elizabeth Komblum, a serologist, detected spermatozoa in Reed's vagina, rectum, and on her underwear, consistent with defendant as a possible African-American donor, and Gerald Burke, a criminalist, found pubic hairs consistent with defendant's in Reed's anal region.
Aaron Cansadillas, a friend of defendant's sister, initially told police that defendant confessed to breaking into a home, finding a 'lady in there,' and having to 'shut her up.'
On April 28, 1987, Kim Edwards observed defendant prying open a window at Kim Meldrum's apartment in Covina, called the police, and defendant was arrested after attempting to flee, giving the name 'Mario Davis.'
On February 6, 1983, defendant broke into J.S.'s apartment, tied her and her eight-year-old granddaughter S.B., beat J.S., sexually molested S.B., and stole money, leaving candy wrappers and his palm print; he subsequently pleaded guilty to burglary for this incident.

Procedural Posture:

Defendant Mario Lewis Gray was charged by information in Los Angeles County Superior Court with first-degree murder, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, and forcible sodomy of Ruby Reed, along with four special circumstance allegations, and six unrelated first-degree burglaries.
Defendant moved unsuccessfully before trial to sever the counts related to the crimes against Reed from the other burglary charges.
During jury selection, defense counsel made two Wheeler motions, arguing the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude African-American jurors R.H. and B.J.; the trial court denied both motions.
The jury initially returned a verdict stating, 'We the jury... find the defendant Mario Lewis Gray guilty of murder in violation of Penal Code section 187(a), a felony, as alleged in Count I of the information,' without specifying the degree of murder.
Defense counsel argued that, under Penal Code section 1157, this verdict constituted a conviction of only second-degree murder.
The trial court reconvened the jury two days later, providing amended verdict forms and instructing them to resume deliberations and render a verdict as to the degree of murder.
The jury then returned a verdict of first-degree murder.
The trial court declared a recess to allow defendant to seek writ relief from the California Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal initially granted writ relief, finding defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder by operation of Penal Code section 1157.
Respondent (the People) petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.
The California Supreme Court granted review, transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its opinion and reconsider the case in light of People v. Bonillas.
After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion denying relief to defendant.
Defendant's petition for review to the California Supreme Court was denied.
The parties then returned to the trial court, and the long-delayed penalty phase of the trial was commenced.
Defense counsel filed a motion for a continuance for the penalty phase, which the trial court denied.

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Issue:

1. Does a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges against African-American prospective jurors, without an explicit finding of discriminatory purpose by the trial court, constitute a Batson v. Kentucky and People v. Wheeler violation when other African-American jurors are seated? 2. Does California Penal Code section 1157, which reduces an un-degreed murder conviction to the lesser degree, apply when a jury, instructed solely on first-degree felony murder, initially fails to specify the degree but is immediately reconvened by the trial court to clarify the verdict while still under the court's control? 3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's prior unadjudicated crimes against different victims to prove identity and intent under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b)?

Opinions:

Majority - Werdegar, J.

No, the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges did not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose under Batson v. Kentucky and People v. Wheeler. The trial court correctly found no prima facie showing of racial bias. Although the trial court did not explicitly state the standard it was applying, this court reviewed the record under the U.S. Supreme Court's 'inference of discriminatory purpose' standard and found no such inference was supported. The prosecutor excluded two African-American jurors but retained two others (one on the regular jury, one on the alternate panel), and the 'bare statistics' of challenges did not suggest racial animus, as non-African-American jurors were also challenged. Even comparing the challenged African-American jurors with non-challenged jurors sharing similar characteristics (e.g., age, foreign birth, Catholicism, child care obligations, prior law enforcement contact), the court found the prosecutor's actions did not appear pretextual, as other plausible factors could explain the strikes (e.g., prior positive jury service experiences, strong pro-death penalty views, personal fears related to crimes). The extent of the voir dire questioning was not desultory or cursory. No, Penal Code section 1157 does not apply to reduce the conviction to second-degree murder in this felony-murder case. First, the 'law of the case' doctrine bars relitigation of this issue, as the Court of Appeal previously decided it after this court directed reconsideration in light of People v. Bonillas. Defendant's arguments for an 'unjust result' or constitutional violation were rejected as reassertions of arguments against applying the doctrine in capital cases, which this court has consistently denied. Alternatively, even if the law of the case doctrine were inapplicable, the trial court did not err in resubmitting the degree question to the jury. Citing People v. Bonillas, the court held that when a jury has not been discharged, remains under the court's control, and is admonished not to discuss the case, an initially incomplete or irregular verdict can be resubmitted for completion. The jury in this case was not discharged and was admonished. Furthermore, under People v. Mendoza, section 1157 does not apply in felony-murder cases where the prosecution's sole theory is first-degree felony murder, as the defendant is not convicted of a crime 'distinguished into degrees' within the meaning of the statute. Defendant's Apprendi and retroactivity challenges to Mendoza were rejected. Yes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's prior unadjudicated crimes against J.S. and S.B. Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) permits evidence of other crimes to prove facts like identity and intent. The 1983 crimes against J.S. and S.B. were 'eerily similar' to the present crimes against Ruby Reed, sharing numerous distinctive common marks (e.g., home invasion, late night/early morning, older victim, tying, gagging with towels, nightgown manipulation, severe beating, sexual conduct, candy wrappers, leaving personal property, ransacking, taking money, smoking, using a phone). These similarities were sufficiently distinctive to support an inference that the same person committed both acts, thereby establishing identity. Regarding intent, defendant's threat to kill S.B.'s grandmother in 1983 was probative of his intent to kill in 1987. The admission of S.B.'s testimony, which corroborated her grandmother's account and clarified aspects of the crime, was not unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, as it was brief and significant. Furthermore, the court found that a prolonged, defendant-instigated delay of 338 days between the guilt and penalty phases of the capital trial did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant failed to object to the delay and actively instigated it by pursuing writ relief, thus forfeiting the claim. On the merits, the court distinguished the instant case from prior federal and state appellate decisions involving trial delays, noting that the delay here occurred at a natural break in the trial (between phases) and was due to an appellate stay, unlike delays during deliberations or without good cause. Concerns about forgotten evidence were ameliorated by the jury having already deliberated on guilt and the court's offer to reread testimony. The court reiterated its reliance on People v. Stanley, presuming jurors followed admonitions not to discuss the case or seek outside information, and dismissed speculation about changed views or improper exposure as insufficient for reversal. The trial court's failure to re-voir dire the jury after the delay was not an abuse of discretion, as no good cause was shown. The court rejected numerous other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and prosecutorial misconduct. IAC claims regarding prosecutorial comment on defense experts were found to have been adequately objected to (on attorney-client privilege grounds) or, if deficient, harmless. Challenges to prosecutorial conduct during expert cross-examination were deemed permissible under Evidence Code sections 721 and 722. Jury instruction claims, including failure to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense for robbery and failure to instruct on lingering doubt, were found to be without merit, harmless, or consistent with established precedent. The denial of the severance motion was affirmed because the crimes were of the same class and cross-admissible due to their distinctive common characteristics. Finally, the defendant's many constitutional challenges to California's death penalty scheme were rejected, reaffirming prior decisions.

Concurring - Baxter, J.

I concur with the majority opinion and also with Justice Chin's concurring opinion. I believe that People v. Coddington (which I authored) should be reexamined in a future case concerning its suggestion that the work product rule might prevent a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's failure to call defense experts who had examined forensic evidence.

Concurring - Chin, J.

I concur with the majority, but I believe the majority should have explored whether to reconsider an aspect of People v. Coddington. That case suggested that the work product privilege would preclude a prosecutor from arguing that the defendant's failure to call defense experts, who had examined forensic evidence, logically indicated they had nothing helpful to contribute. I now question whether Coddington's work product analysis was flawed, as it seems inconsistent with the general rule allowing a prosecutor to comment on the defense's failure to call a retained expert or other logical witness to rebut the prosecution's case. I see nothing in the prosecutor's arguments in this case or Coddington that infringed on the defense's work product or privacy. It seems reasonable and legitimate for a prosecutor to observe that no defense experts were called to contradict the prosecution's experts, especially when all forensic evidence was made available to the defense. I believe Coddington should be disapproved on this point in a future case.

Analysis:

This case reinforces several key legal principles in California. First, it clarifies the application of the Batson/Wheeler standard, emphasizing the 'inference of discriminatory purpose' over the 'more likely than not' threshold, and demonstrating the importance of comparative juror analysis even at the prima facie stage. Second, the decision confirms the limited applicability of Penal Code section 1157 in felony-murder contexts, distinguishing it from cases where the jury has discretion over murder degree. Third, it provides a strong illustration of when prior uncharged crimes are sufficiently distinctive to be admissible for identity and intent, offering specific examples of common marks. Finally, the case reiterates that prolonged trial delays, particularly those instigated by the defendant, do not automatically constitute constitutional error if jurors are appropriately admonished and no actual prejudice is shown, reinforcing the presumption that juries follow court instructions.

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