People v. Grant
46 Ill. App. 3d 125, 360 N.E.2d 809 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
The defense of automatism, where a defendant's actions are involuntary due to a condition such as a psychomotor epileptic seizure, is distinct from the affirmative defense of insanity. When evidence of automatism is presented, the trial court must instruct the jury on the requirement that a criminal offense must include a voluntary act, separate from any instruction on insanity.
Facts:
- Seth Grant has a documented medical history of psychomotor epilepsy, which has previously resulted in violent attacks.
- On December 13, 1974, Grant consumed four alcoholic drinks at the 'Watering Place' tavern over a 2.5-hour period.
- While police were arresting another patron outside the tavern amidst a hostile crowd, Grant, who had not been previously involved, suddenly ran from the crowd.
- Grant used a parking meter for leverage, leaped into the air, and struck Officer Raymond Vonderahe twice in the face.
- Approximately one hour after his arrest, while in a jail cell, Grant was discovered having a grand mal convulsive seizure.
- A medical expert, Dr. Albert Ludin, testified that Grant suffered from temporal lobe epilepsy and opined that at the time of the attack, Grant was likely suffering from a psychomotor seizure which prevented his conscious mind from controlling his actions.
- Grant testified that he 'blacked out' at the tavern and remembered nothing until waking up three days later.
Procedural Posture:
- Seth Grant was charged in the Circuit Court of Logan County with aggravated battery and obstructing a police officer.
- A jury found Grant guilty of both offenses.
- The trial court entered judgment on both verdicts but imposed a sentence of 3 to 9 years in prison only for the aggravated battery conviction.
- Grant, as the appellant, appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit a reversible error by instructing a jury solely on the defense of insanity when the defendant presents evidence that their criminal conduct may have been the result of an involuntary state of automatism caused by a psychomotor epileptic seizure?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. JUSTICE Reardon
Yes. The jury instructions were substantially defective because they failed to include an instruction on the defense of involuntary conduct (automatism), which is distinct from the insanity defense. The Illinois Criminal Code requires that a 'voluntary act' is a material element of every offense. Automatism, defined as acting without consciousness of one's actions, negates this essential element. The defense of insanity, which requires a mental disease or defect leading to a lack of capacity to appreciate criminality or conform conduct, is a separate legal concept. Because the defendant presented evidence that he may have been in a state of automatism, the jury should have been instructed on the legal requirement of a voluntary act. The court held that the interests of justice required reversal despite the defense's failure to tender the specific instruction, as this was a case of first impression in Illinois. On remand, the jury could still find the defendant criminally responsible if it determines he recklessly brought about the state of automatism, for example, by drinking alcohol with prior knowledge of his susceptibility to seizures.
Dissenting - Mr. JUSTICE Green
No. The failure to specifically instruct on involuntary action does not require a new trial because the concept was encompassed within the insanity instruction that was given. The dissent argues that a state of automatism brought on by an epileptic seizure fits within the legal definition of insanity, specifically as a mental disease or defect that results in a 'lack of substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' The jury heard the evidence about the epileptic seizure and, by finding the defendant sane and guilty, necessarily rejected the factual premise that he was in a state of automatism. Therefore, the jury implicitly rejected the evidence that would have supported an involuntary act defense, and giving a separate instruction would not have changed the outcome.
Analysis:
This case is significant as it is the first in Illinois to formally distinguish the defense of automatism from the affirmative defense of insanity. By doing so, the court established that a defendant can argue their actions were involuntary without needing to meet the legal criteria for insanity. This creates a separate, non-insanity defense based on the lack of a voluntary act, which is a required element of most crimes. The decision protects defendants from the potential for civil commitment that can follow a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' but also introduces the concept that one may be held liable for recklessly causing their own state of automatism.
