People v. Goldstein
810 N.Y.S.2d 100, 843 N.E.2d 727, 6 N.Y.3d 119 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
An expert witness testifying for the prosecution violates a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by recounting testimonial statements made by non-testifying third parties. Statements made to a government-retained expert in preparation for trial are considered testimonial for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
Facts:
- The defendant, who had a history of schizophrenia, killed Kendra Webdale, a stranger, by throwing her into the path of an approaching subway train on January 3, 1999.
- Immediately after the killing, the defendant stated words to the effect of, 'I’m psychotic, take me to the hospital.'
- About two years prior, in late 1996, the defendant had assaulted another woman at a Waldbaum's supermarket. When restrained by a security guard, John E, the defendant repeatedly said, 'I’m sick, I’m sick, I’m schizophrenic.'
- Two months before killing Webdale, the defendant was allegedly teased by a woman named Stephanie H., who, according to an acquaintance named Kimberly D., bore a 'remarkable similarity in appearance' to Kendra Webdale.
- At one point, the defendant's landlady, Serita G., was told by her maid that the defendant was lying exposed on his bed and did not cover himself when the maid entered the room.
- In the month before Webdale's death, the defendant's roommate, Isaac V, described the defendant as 'a little weird' but also 'never disrespectful and never violent and very calm.'
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with murder in the second degree in New York Supreme Court, the state's trial-level court.
- The defendant's first trial ended in a hung jury.
- Following a second trial, a jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder, rejecting his insanity defense.
- The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, New York's intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
- The defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a psychiatrist testifying for the prosecution violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by recounting to the jury testimonial hearsay statements from non-testifying third parties that formed part of the basis for her expert opinion?
Opinions:
Majority - R.S. Smith, J.
Yes. A defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him is violated when a psychiatrist testifying for the prosecution recounts testimonial statements made to her by people who are not available for cross-examination. Applying Crawford v. Washington, the court found the interviewees' statements were hearsay offered for their truth, as the jury could not evaluate the expert's opinion without assuming the truth of the statements. These statements were also testimonial because the interviewees made them to an agent of the state (the prosecution's retained expert) under circumstances where they should have reasonably expected the statements would be used prosecutorially at a later trial. Because the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine these individuals, admitting their statements through the expert's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. The error was not harmless because the statements provided significant support for the prosecution's theory that the defendant was sane.
Dissenting - Read, J.
No, the conviction should be affirmed because any error was harmless. While the majority's analysis under Crawford v. Washington is reasonable, the admission of the four statements did not prejudice the defendant. The evidence of the defendant's sanity was overwhelming, based on eyewitness testimony describing his deliberate and meticulous actions on the subway platform, which directly contradicted the defense theory of a 'transient psychotic episode.' The challenged hearsay statements were largely cumulative of other evidence or were insignificant in the context of the entire case. Therefore, any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction should stand.
Analysis:
This decision significantly applies the principles of Crawford v. Washington to the context of expert witness testimony in New York. It establishes that the Confrontation Clause limits the extent to which an expert can act as a 'conduit' for testimonial hearsay, even if state evidence rules might otherwise permit it as the basis for an expert opinion. This ruling forces prosecutors to choose between calling the individuals who provided information to their expert as witnesses, thereby subjecting them to cross-examination, or having their expert's testimony limited to opinions not based on such testimonial statements. The case reinforces the primacy of the constitutional right to cross-examination over evidentiary rules concerning expert testimony.
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