People v. Godlewski
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 17 Cal. App. 4th 940, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5921 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The attorney-client privilege is a fundamental and sacred right that generally cannot be easily overridden, even when a co-defendant asserts it impedes their right to a fair trial, particularly when there is a potential for adversarial mischief and other means of defense are available.
Facts:
- Raymond E. Godlewski, desiring to kill his father, hired Gene Flack to commit the crime.
- Flack enlisted Michael Brown’s assistance in carrying out the murder.
- At approximately 12:30 a.m. on July 4, 1989, Brown drove Flack to the victim’s home in Sylmar, where Flack murdered the victim with a single shotgun blast to the head.
- Brown then drove Flack from the crime scene.
- On July 5, 1989, Flack told Paul Caines that he had committed the murder.
- During a phone conversation placed from county jail, Flack's grandmother, Emma Baugh, spoke with a man identified as "Ray, Jr." who admitted personally killing the victim and promised to exonerate Flack and Brown.
- Similarly, Flack's mother, Elizabeth McLemore, spoke with a man identified as "Ray" during a jail phone conversation, who claimed he had accidentally killed his father.
- A county jail inmate named Steve White allegedly overheard a conversation in the 'lockup' between Godlewski and his lawyer, where Godlewski purportedly indicated he would tell people he committed the murder rather than blaming Flack and Brown.
- Godlewski denied Baugh's allegations about the conversation during his testimony.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond E. Godlewski, Gene Flack, and Michael Brown were jointly charged with murder.
- At trial, one jury was impaneled for defendants Brown and Flack, while a separate jury was impaneled for defendant Godlewski.
- Godlewski was convicted of second-degree murder.
- Flack was convicted of first-degree murder, and the special circumstance allegation of murder for financial gain was found true.
- Brown was convicted of first-degree murder (a special circumstance allegation against Brown had been stricken before trial).
- Flack appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred in barring the testimony of Steve White, to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by excluding an overheard statement between a co-defendant and his attorney, asserted to be protected by attorney-client privilege, when another co-defendant seeks to introduce it as an admission of guilt that would exonerate him?
Opinions:
Majority - Vogel (C. S.), J.
No, a trial court does not err by excluding an overheard statement between a co-defendant and his attorney, protected by attorney-client privilege, even when another co-defendant seeks to introduce it for his defense, especially when the probative value of the statement is low and alternative means of defense are available. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the confidential communications privileges, serving to safeguard the confidential relationship between client and counsel and promote full disclosure, thereby implementing the constitutional right to effective representation. This privilege is considered sacred and not to be easily discarded simply because a defendant asserts it denies their right to a fair trial. The court distinguished precedents involving accomplices who had already pled guilty, noting the "great potential for mischief" inherent in co-defendant trials where each attempts to shift responsibility. While acknowledging a balancing process may be employed in extraordinary circumstances, the court found the balance here weighed against overriding the privilege. The intrinsic probative value of Godlewski's overheard statement was low, as it merely suggested a trial tactic ("That’s what I’m going to tell them, that I did it, not these guys") rather than an affirmative, factual admission of guilt. Furthermore, Flack had alternative means to present his defense, including testimony from Emma Baugh, Elizabeth McLemore, and his own trial testimony recounting Godlewski's confession to him. The trial court also mitigated potential prejudice by precluding the People from arguing that there was no corroboration for Baugh's and McLemore's testimony.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the robust protection afforded to the attorney-client privilege, particularly in the complex adversarial context of co-defendant trials. It establishes a high bar for breaching this privilege, emphasizing its constitutional underpinnings and the potential for strategic abuse. Future defendants attempting to override a co-defendant's attorney-client privilege will likely need to demonstrate truly extraordinary circumstances, including clear and substantial probative value of the communication and a complete lack of alternative avenues for their defense, which was not met here. The court's explicit distinction between an accomplice who has pleaded guilty and a jointly tried co-defendant suggests a narrower application of the balancing test in the latter scenario, making such breaches exceedingly rare.
