People v. Gleghorn
193 Cal.App.3d 196, 238 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
An initial aggressor who initiates a felonious assault, creating circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their life, cannot claim self-defense against the victim's use of deadly force in response.
Facts:
- Melody Downes and Kelsey Dru Gleghorn lived in the same house, and Downes rented the garage to Michael Fairall.
- After a dispute with Downes over a stereo, Fairall vandalized her car and broke into her house, damaging property.
- Downes informed Gleghorn of Fairall's actions.
- At 3 a.m., Gleghorn went to the garage where Fairall was sleeping, pounded on the door, and announced his intention to kill Fairall.
- Gleghorn entered the garage with a stick, began beating the rafters near Fairall's mattress, and then set some of Fairall's clothes on fire.
- From the rafters, Fairall shot Gleghorn in the back with a bow and arrow.
- After Fairall climbed down from the rafters, Gleghorn severely beat him with the stick, causing a broken jaw, lost teeth, and other serious injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Kelsey Dru Gleghorn was charged in a trial court with assault by means of force likely to incur great bodily injury and battery with the infliction of serious bodily injury.
- A jury found Gleghorn guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault and guilty of battery with infliction of serious bodily injury.
- Gleghorn filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- Gleghorn, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Is an initial aggressor who makes a felonious assault on another person entitled to use deadly force in self-defense when the victim responds with a deadly counterattack?
Opinions:
Majority - Stone, P. J.
No. An initial aggressor whose felonious actions create a reasonable fear of imminent peril in another is not entitled to self-defense against a deadly counterattack. The right of self-defense is based upon the appearance of imminent peril from the perspective of the person being attacked, not the secret intent of the aggressor. Here, Gleghorn's actions—announcing his intent to kill, breaking in, beating the rafters, and setting a fire—were felonious and created an appearance that justified Fairall's use of deadly force. Because Gleghorn was the initial, felonious aggressor and did not withdraw from the conflict, he forfeited his right to self-defense. Furthermore, even if a right to self-defense had existed, Gleghorn exceeded it by continuing to beat Fairall after he was disabled and no longer a threat.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the 'initial aggressor' doctrine within self-defense law, clarifying that the right to self-defense is not available to one who provokes a deadly conflict through their own felonious conduct. The court's focus on the 'appearance of imminent peril' from the victim's perspective is critical, establishing that an aggressor's subjective intent is irrelevant when their actions would lead a reasonable person to fear for their life. This decision solidifies the principle that one cannot create a life-threatening situation and then legally justify harming the victim who defends themselves.
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